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 Abstract  
 
The Mareva injunction has been available in England for 40 years. Initially, the 
Mareva injunction was a contentious form of relief; today it is regarded as an 
exceptionally effective device in common law jurisdictions across the globe.  
 
This body of work critically appraises the development, evolution and effectiveness 
of the Mareva injunction. It is primarily established that the Mareva injunction is an 
equitable remedy. A corollary crystallises; in order to gain a fuller understanding of 
the Mareva injunction it is necessary to contextualise it within the equitable 
jurisdiction. Traditional doctrinal research methods explicate the development of the 
equitable jurisdiction drawing attention to certain characteristics, common themes, 
techniques and principles. Equity becomes the contextual framework upon which the 
ensuing discourse is rendered. At its heart equity is found to be about remedies; a 
supplementary system which repairs defects in the law. The Mareva injunction was 
devised to ring fence amenable assets on a temporary basis; to protect the possibility 
of an effective remedy. The continuing effectiveness of the Mareva injunction is 
examined in relation to evolving externalities such as the rise of globalisation 
inclusive of developing financial infrastructures and improving technologies. The 
action taken by the courts to overcome the difficulties presented by the 
abovementioned evolving conditions are evaluated. The range of ancillary and 
connected orders of the court which have been created or refined in order to ensure 
that the Mareva injunction remains effective are critically appraised. It is argued that 
the Mareva injunction can no longer be viewed in isolation; it is part of an evolving 
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Introduction   
 
0.1. The focus of this thesis is the Mareva injunction.  An effective explanation of 
the Mareva injunction is derived from a description of the circumstances under 
which it is regularly granted. The Mareva injunction is commonly ordered to prevent 
a defendant from evading or escaping its obligations to a creditor by disposing of or 
transferring assets beyond the jurisdiction with the intention of preventing the 
applicant from executing an ensuing judgment against those assets. Today in England 
the jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction is derived from section 37 of the Senior 
Courts Act 1981. The relevant procedural rules are found in the Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR): Part 25 ‘Interim Remedies and Security for Costs’ and Practice Direction 25A 
‘Interim Injunctions’.1 In order to obtain the order an applicant must be able to: 
establish a cause of action by evidencing an underlying right in law or equity; 
demonstrate the existence of assets within the jurisdiction;2 demonstrate a real risk 
that the respondent’s assets may be dissipated; and present a good arguable case, 
demonstrating that success at trial is likely, and that if the order is refused then there 
is a genuine risk that any favourable ensuing judgment award would remain 
unsatisfied. As such, the Mareva jurisdiction is about the business of protecting the 
administration of justice. One of the important features of the Mareva injunction is 
that an application thereof will ordinarily be made ex parte (i.e. without notice) in 
                                                     
1
 Specific court guides also contain particular provisions relating to Mareva orders, see: The Chancery 
Guide, sections 5.25 to 5.36; Queen’s Bench Guide, section 7.13 and The Admiralty & Commercial 
Courts Guide (9
th
 edn), section F15 and Appendix 5.   
2
 Although note, Ch 3 para 3.12. on the Worldwide Mareva Jurisdiction ‘Foreign Assets and 
Proceedings’.   
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order to maintain the element of surprise which is often necessary to prevent the 
defendant from abusing an opportunity to dissipate their assets prior to its award. It 
shall be seen that the characteristic elements of speed and secrecy are just two 
features which have gained the Mareva injunction the reputation of being one of the 
law’s nuclear weapons.  
 
0.2. The aims and objectives outlined herein are achieved by means of a doctrinal 
research approach. The Mareva jurisdiction is explicated by way of a systematic 
exposition of the equitable principles and rules which have governed the availability 
of the Mareva injunction throughout time. There is an analysis of the relationship 
between equitable principles, restrictive common law precedents and certain 
customary policy considerations which have impacted upon the Mareva jurisdiction. 
It is observed that to some extent these considerations have created difficulties for 
claimants and practitioners but on further analysis it becomes apparent that the 
judiciary have overcome those difficulties via the formulation of innovative remedies 
and procedures. The propensity of the English judiciary to overcome those difficulties 
leaves an optimistic impression at the close of the thesis.  
 
0.3. The research herein is not reform-orientated. It is a body of theoretical 
research with a fundamental aspect; theoretical because it promotes a fuller 
understanding of the conceptual basis of the Mareva jurisdiction in reference to the 
combined effect of a range of variables which impact upon it; fundamental because 
it generates a more holistic or profound understanding of the Mareva jurisdiction as 
a social phenomenon inclusive of historical and economic derivations and 
implications.  A range of conventional library based legal research sources are 
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utilised throughout this body of work. There is a continuous content analysis of case 
law and legislation. Furthermore, the works of numerous notable and acclaimed 
jurists, practitioners and academic lawyers are reviewed; all are considered to be 
influential. Of particular note are the works or SFC Spry,3 Edmund Henry Turner 
Snell,4 Steven Gee,5 Felicity Toube,6 William Blackstone,7 JH Baker,8 FW Maitland,9 
William S Holdsworth,10 HSG Halsbury,11 WR Cornish12 and Joseph Story.13 A critical 
perspective is generated throughout the discourse via the inclusion and 
consideration of scholarly and practitioner journal articles.     
   
0.4. This thesis has four broad aims. The discourse is directed at: firstly, 
establishing how and why the Mareva injunction was developed; secondly, 
establishing why the Mareva injunction is regarded as an extraordinarily effective 
device; thirdly, establishing whether equity has the capacity to evolve in order to 
protect the integrity of the processes of the courts in order to fortify the 
administration of justice in an ever changing world; and fourthly, establishing how 
the courts ensure that the Mareva jurisdiction remains an effective one. 
 
                                                     
3
 ICF Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and 
Equitable Damages (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 2014). 
4
 Edmund Henry Turner Snell and John A McGhee, Snell’s Principles of Equity (JA McGhee ed, 32nd 
edn, Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited 2010). 
5
 Steven Gee, Commercial Injunctions (Formerly Mareva Injunctions and Anton Pillar Relief) (Sweet 
& Maxwell 2004). 
6
 Felicity Toube, Jonathan Wheeler and Kevin Roberts, ‘England and Wales’ in Felicity Toube 
(ed), International Asset Tracing in Insolvency (OUP 2009). 
7
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-
1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979). 
8
 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, Butterworths 2003); 
9
 FW Maitland, Equity Also The Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Course of Lectures (CUP 
1929). 
10
 William S Holdsworth, History of English Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1969). 
11
 HSG Halsbury, Halsbury’s Laws of England (Butterworths 2007). 
12
 WR Cornish, The Oxford History of the Laws of England (OUP 2010). 
13
 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in England and America Vol 
Ii (3rd edn, C C Little & J Brown 1843). 
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0.5. The second broad objective of this body of work is to establish why the 
Mareva injunction is considered to be an extraordinarily effective device. That 
objective goes hand in hand with the first broad objective; establishing how and why 
the Mareva injunction was developed. To understand what makes it such an 
extraordinarily effective device the heritage of the Mareva injunction is examined 
within the context of the equitable jurisdiction during Chapter One. It is argued that 
a valuable understanding of the modern exposition of equitable principles and 
remedies necessitates an appreciation of what they are as well as how and why they 
were established. In order to gain that insight the historical and contextual 
development of equity is outlined and discussed inclusive of certain common themes 
which characterise the jurisdiction; thematic concepts such as conscience and the 
pursuit of the spirit of justice. The birth and growth of equity are examined in 
relation to the development of the common law and the relationship between the 
two systems. It becomes apparent that much which governs the Mareva jurisdiction 
can be ascribed to its heritage within the equitable jurisdiction. As such equity is a 
topic which is interwoven into the fabric of this thesis.  
 
0.6. Chapter Two builds upon the foundations laid in Chapter One. As noted, 
Chapter One establishes that the Mareva injunction is a creature of equity, about the 
business of preserving the spirit of justice and preventing unconscionable conduct. 
Chapter Two validates those submissions by way of the contextual delineation of the 
development of the Mareva injunction during the second half of the 1970s. The 
discussion addresses the application of equitable techniques in practice, 
demonstrating how the peculiar equitable jurisdiction facilitated a shift away from 
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the customary English position which barred Mareva relief towards the modern and 
formative codified position which enables an applicant to obtain an injunction to 
freeze a defendant’s assets where there is a risk that they may attempt to deal with 
their assets in a manner or form which would nullify an eventual judgment reward. 
The chapter’s objects are delivered through a discussion of relevant case law in 
addition to an evaluation of the judicial rationale which underscored this area of law. 
The emerging modern business world inclusive of developing modern technologies is 
found to be significant; amplifying the risk that debtors may evade their obligations 
to creditors. What becomes apparent during Chapter Two is that the development of 
Mareva jurisdiction is itself a paradigmatic validation of the third abovementioned 
broad objective; establishing whether equity has the capacity to evolve in order to 
protect the integrity of the processes of the courts in order to fortify the 
administration of justice in an ever changing world. That validation is further fortified 
in the subsequent chapter.   
 
0.7. In Chapter Three the focus moves from the fledgling cases which brought 
about the birth of the Mareva jurisdiction towards the modern Mareva jurisdiction. 
The aim is to gain an understanding of the modern scenarios which cause a creditor 
to consider supplicating the Mareva jurisdiction. It becomes apparent that the typical 
scenarios which gave rise to a Mareva application in the 1970s are not the same 
today. It is observed that the developing pan-global economy enables increasingly 
intricate commercial transactions to be established. The extent to which the modern 
global economy presents creditors with distinct problems is addressed and it is 
established that modern technologies facilitate skilfully fashioned deals which create 
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more opportunities for debtors to renege on their creditor obligations. Having 
generated an impression of the adverse complex scenarios which a creditor can be 
faced with another aim crystallises, namely an assessment of some of the strategic 
options available to a practitioner to overcome the formidable challenges presented 
by the modern deceptive debtor. In the process of achieving that aim the third and 
fourth broad objectives receive additional consideration as the measures taken by 
the English courts to ensure that the Mareva jurisdiction remains an effective one 
are discussed in relation to the adverse scenarios which are exacerbated by the 
modernising and evolving world. It becomes apparent that there is an ostensible 
interplay between the third and fourth broad objectives. The propensity of the 
English judiciary to create innovative responses to new problems in order to render 
the Mareva jurisdiction effective becomes clear. It is seen that a range of ancillary 
and connected orders have been created which allow claimants to act covertly and 
decisively to protect their interests in assets which may otherwise be spirited away. 
Those remedies are found to consist of a range of pre-trial interlocutory orders which 
may be set up to freeze an amenable asset, tender discovery or preserve evidence 
where it appears likely that a defendant has acted or will act to organise their affairs 
with the intention of defeating an eventual judgment reward.       
 
0.8. In chapter Four the distinct problems created by separate corporate 
personality are discussed in relation to the Mareva jurisdiction. The principle of 
separate corporate personality which stands as one of the foremost principles of 
English Company law is found to present distinct problems for practitioners who 
advise creditors. It is established law that in England a company is both an 
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association of its members and also an entity separate from its members. It is 
precisely because a company is considered to be an entity separate from its 
members that a legal persona is conferred upon it. Concisely, the company is a 
person in the eyes of the law. As a result of this concept it is accepted that a 
company can enter into contracts of its own volition and also own property. It 
becomes apparent that these truths create additional difficulties where the 
proprietary status of non-defendant company assets are concerned in the case of a 
respondent to a standard form freezing order who also owns and controls that 
company. The difficulty, which pivots upon whether or not a standard form 
injunction can legitimately touch those assets, is discussed in relation to two recent 
High Court cases which presented two incompatible judgments. Ultimately, a Court 
of Appeal decision is discussed which provided clarification on the issue of separate 
corporate personality and third party asset holdings. At the close of the final chapter 
a prevailing conclusion matures which aligns closely with the perspective of Professor 
Sir Roy Goode: The Mareva jurisdiction constitutes a remarkable example of the 
effectiveness of procedural law and the continuing creative role of the judiciary.14       
 
 
    
                                                     
14
 Professor Sir Roy Goode and Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin 
Books 2010) 1289. 
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1.1. The focus of this dissertation is the Mareva injunction, contemporarily 
referred to as the freezing order.   According to Eden ‘an Injunction is a writ, issuing 
by the order and under the seal of a court of equity’.1 Whilst there are reported 
instances where a Court of Law exercised a prima facie analogous power, for 
example by way of a writ of prohibition and estrepement in the case of waste,2 the 
application of such analogous legal doctrines were rare and according to Eden fell 
‘completely into disuse’.3 Consequently Story’s statement, that the jurisdiction to 
grant injunctions was a power ‘peculiar to Courts of Equity’ is widely accepted.4 The 
submission that an injunction is an equitable remedy is of little value in the absence 
of an understanding of what equity is and what it actually means. It has been 
suggested that discussing modern case law in reference to the equitable principles 
and case law of the past may mask the rational integrity of the law.5 On the contrary, 
a valuable understanding of the modern exposition of equitable principles and 
                                                     
1
 Robert Henley Eden, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions 1789-1841(Joseph Butterworth & Son 
1821) 1. 
2
 Jefferson v the Bishop of Durham (1797) 1 Bos & Pul 121.  
3
 Eden (n 1) 159. 
4
 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in England and America Vol 
Ii (3rd edn, C C Little & J Brown 1843) 184; for a deconstruction of Story’s submission see, RP 
Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Bummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (4th edn, Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2002) 11.  
5
 Peter Birks, ‘Reviews and Notes: Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies. 
4th Ed’ (2004) 120 LQR 344.  
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remedies demands an understanding of what they actually are as well as how and 
why they were established.  
 
1.2. Equity is a concept and a subject which is inextricably interwoven within the 
very fabric of this thesis. Mareva Injunctions are said to be an equitable remedy; they 
fall within the remit of equity’s jurisdiction. This Chapter is concerned with 
establishing what it actually means to say that an injunction is equitable. In pursuit of 
that understanding, the historical development of equity will be outlined and 
discussed. Certain common themes which permeate equity’s jurisdiction will be 
identified. In the process of identifying and discussing those themes it will become 
apparent that the growth of equity’s jurisdiction has been fundamental to the 
holistic development of the English legal system. The inauguration and evolution of 
equity will be examined in relation to the development of the common law. The 
significance of the relationship between the law and equity will be surveyed and 
established as a major contributing factor to the fluctuating availability of specific 
remedies such as injunctive relief from the medieval period to the modern day.   
 
Common Themes within Equity  
 
1.3. Equity can be broadly understood to pertain to notions of justice, ideas which 
go beyond the practical, procedural or bureaucratic rules which constitute the 
positive law.6 Conceived of as such, equity has contributed significantly to several 
legal systems, in some instances intentionally incorporated, and others conceived of 
                                                     
6
 Ronald Dworkin, The Philosophy of Law (OUP 1979) 17; Edmund Henry Turner Snell and John A 




almost inadvertently.7 Equity introduces an element to the positive law which is 
underpinned by concepts of ethics; the pursuit of the spirit of justice. Equity is a 
particularly stratified concept deriving its composition from innumerable and often 
diverse sources,8 but there is a common theme – equity is a supplementary system. 
Within the submission that equity is supplementary lies the datum that for equity to 
intervene there is a requirement that the positive law or a set of primary rules 
already exists. In England this state of affairs is deep-routed; it is embedded within 
the legal system. The established status quo is confirmed by the often cited equitable 
maxim ‘equity follows the law’.9 As such, equity can be considered to be secondary 
or ancillary but as shall be argued that it is not by association subordinate. Equity can 
qualify or legitimise the administration and application of the positive law by 
compelling those who are party to proceedings to submit to a more conscionable, a 
more ‘complete’ form of justice than the primary rules of the unaided positive law 
are mandated to generate.10    
 
The value of equity to our legal system 
 
1.4. It is not suggested that acknowledging the influence of equity’s jurisdiction 
entails questioning the legitimacy of the positive law. Neither is it suggested that that 
the law is bereft of any moral content or worth. It is however advocated that to 
recognise the impact of equity concurs with the submission of Aristotle that the 
                                                     
7
 R Newman, Equity in the World’s Legal Systems (Establissments Emile Bruyland 1973). 14-18.  
8
 H Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern 
Ideas (Murray 1861) 44.  
9
 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [33] (Lord Walker HL); Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [22] 
(Lord Walker & Lady Hale SCJJ).  
10
 Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Rly Co (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279 [284].  
11 
 
joined labours of equity and the positive law are focussed upon achieving a complete 
justice although by alternative means.11 However to some extent equity’s 
development is attributable to the conflict which arose between its jurisdictional 
boundaries and those of the law. In an ideal world the perfect legal system would 
comprise objective principles applied universally. The reality is that that the 
application of the positive law can have the effect that an unjust result occurs; the 
generality of prescribed and inflexible rules fail to accommodate the diverse array of 
scenarios which arise in everyday life. In such situations equity may intervene in 
order to deliver supplementary assistance, ensuring that a more holistic justice is 
served which can account and adjust for the unique array of cases that arise in 
practice. Broadly speaking equity possesses more flexibility and as a result it can 
tender bespoke responses to atypical or original cases. Nonetheless as shall be 
discussed in due course equity is not a capricious jurisdiction. In the exercise of his or 
her equitable jurisdiction a judge works to adjudicate in accord with what he or she 
believes that the law maker would want if that exceptional or unique case was laid 
before them.12 In a nutshell, when exercising equitable jurisdiction a court 
determines in accordance with the ‘spirit of the rule and not according to the 
strictness of the letter’.13   
 
 
                                                     
11
 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Nicomanchean Ethics (Robert C Bartlett and Susan D Collins, tr, eds, University 
of Chicago Press 2011) 90-115. 
12
 M McNair, ‘Equity and Conscience’ (2007) 27 (4) OJLS 659, 660.  
13
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 
1765-1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979) iii 429. 
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Injunctions: a creature born out of conflict?  
 
1.5. As discussed, to understand the nature and application of injunctive relief 
within the English legal system an explanation of equity’s historical derivations is 
beneficial. While the logic of examining the origins and development of injunctions 
within the contextual framework of the equitable jurisdiction could be called into 
question, it is maintained that in order to generate a meaningful understanding of 
the modern use of injunctions it is necessary to consider the jurisdictional issues 
which have affected their availability, to establish how they came to be as well as the 
ways in which their use has evolved through time. Looking specifically at the English 
jurisdiction it can be said that equity pertains to those doctrines and remedies which 
were generated by the Court of the Chancery prior to its abolition under the 
Judicature Acts of 1873-1875.14 According to Maitland, equity began its development 
in earnest throughout the medieval era through the interactions of the Lord 
Chancellors and their office, namely the Chancery.15 It should not be inferred that 
equity ceased its development when these Acts became operative. As shall be 
observed latter in this discourse equity is a progressive jurisdiction, its principles may 
evolve to accommodate contemporary scenarios.16  
 
1.6. It was established earlier that the supplementary nature of equity requires 
the existence of a more prescribed system of law. In England the system which 
provided those foundations and expedited the conception of equity was the 
                                                     
14
 McGhee (n 6) 4; A Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary 
Common Law World’ (1994) 110 LQR 238; FW Maitland, Equity Also The Forms of Action at 
Common Law: Two Course of Lectures (CUP 1929) 1-3.  
15
 Maitland (n 14) 1-5. 
16
 Re Hallett’s Estate (1879-80) LR 13 Ch D 696 [710] (Sir George Jessel MR).  
13 
 
common law which commenced and developed quickly from the time of the Norman 
Conquest of 1066 and the rule of Henry III. Throughout this early developing period 
the common law possessed insufficient precedent to direct a judge when 
adjudicating a dispute. Courts worked broadly to provide a regimented system 
directed towards determining quarrels; certain practices employed in the process 
would surely now be considered archaic and draconian, for example trial by 
combat.17 The Chancellor was central to the fledgling development of the common 
law as the office of the Chancellor was authorised to issue the necessary writs which 
enabled a litigant to begin an action in the common law courts. In time legislative 
restrictions, (particularly the Provisions of Oxford 1258 and the Statute of 
Westminster the Second (De Donis Conditonalibus) 1285 constrained the 
Chancellor’s independent authority to issue any new forms of writ. As a result of 
such restrictions the common law came to be regarded by some as a system unable 
to justly address the distinct merits of an atypical case. The system was criticised 
because when presented with two prima facie similar cases the common law could 
not differentiate between the unique material facts of a case which litigants felt 
justified a modified or different application of the law.  There were also concerns 
that influential and powerful parties to a trial may be able to coerce a jury, resist or 
frustrate a court order. By way of a contextually apt example a court order may be 
frustrated by way of a defendants’ dissipating or otherwise relocating impugned 
assets; rendering an order to pay monies futile.18 Therein lays a brief summary of 
some stimuli which prompted the development and intervention of equity.             
                                                     
17
 CK Allen, Law in the Making (7th edn, OUP 1964). 399-405.  
18
 William S Holdsworth, History of English Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1969) 1:398-403.  
14 
 
The heavenly origins of equity’s jurisdiction  
 
1.7. It became a common practice that where a litigant felt that justice was not 
being served in the common law courts an appeal would made directly to the King as 
the ‘fount of justice;’ the highest point of corporeal appeal. The sovereigns authority 
as the ‘fount of justice’ derived legitimacy from the idea that the King was God’s 
representative on earth, imbued with the blood of Christ established by a traceable 
bloodline to King David  which was itself traced to the great patriarchs of the old 
testament ending at Adam born of YHWH-Elohim the monotheistic Judaeo-Christian 
deity. During the first half of the 14th Century high volumes of applications requesting 
the King’s adjudication prompted the King to delegate with increasing regularity his 
judicial responsibilities to the Chancellor who would thereby exercise the sovereign’s 
residuary jurisdiction as the ‘keeper of the King’s conscience’.19 In 1349 the volume 
of applications was such that Edward III issued an order which sanctioned the 
delegation of his royal judicial virtues. In 1474 Edward the IV made a declaration 
which effectually transferred his judicial authority to the Chancellor entirely. The 
upshot of Edward IV’s decree was the creation of a Court of the Chancery - distinct 







                                                     
19
  MF Morris, An Introduction to the History of the Development of Law (University of California 
Libraries 1909) 278. 
20
  Holdsworth (n 18) 1:400-404. 
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The essence of equity  
 
1.8. Sources from the early days of the Chancery indicate that the Chancellor 
justified his intervention on vague and inconsistent concepts of conscience.21 Indeed 
conscience came to be a chancery hallmark; emblematic of what the chancery stood 
for. Unfortunately, neither the Chancellor’s specific incentives nor his justifications 
are known in full today because the Chancellors reasoning’s were either not 
recorded or were poorly preserved.22 Considering the function of the Chancellor in 
reference to the common law adds valuable insight toward the focus of this 
dissertation. The rigidity of the common law limited a judge’s autonomy due to the 
exacting procedure for pleadings, allegations, tracing and receiving evidence. In 
contrast the Chancellor was comparatively less restricted, possessing the authority to 
elicit a wider array of evidence which was admissible within the jurisdiction of the 
Chancery.23 Such exploratory techniques enabled a Chancellor to circumnavigate or 
avoid altogether certain formalities and technicalities which could defeat an 
applicant’s claim at common law. Thus imparting to the Chancery relative freedom to 
pursue the spirit of justice free from the bureaucratic obstacles which hindered the 
common law. Equity’s purposeful pursuit of the spirit of justice is a fundamental 
facet of this discourse. In chapter two it shall become apparent that the birth of the 
Mareva jurisdiction is a prime example of how an equitable jurisdiction was 
                                                     
21
 DR Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (Ashgate 
Publishing 2010) 11-19; TS Haskett, ‘The Medieval English Court of Chancery’ (1996) 14 (2) Law and 
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22
 Haskett Ibid, 263.  
23
 A Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity’ (2002) 22 (1) OJLS 1. J Getzler, 
‘Patterns of Fussion’ in P Birks (ed), The Classification of obligations (Clarendon Press 1997).  
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established and utilised to fortify the integrity of the court’s processes; to tender the 
effective administration of justice.24     
 
Common Law conflict  
 
1.9. Numerous jurists suggest that the activities of the medieval chancery were 
considered to be contentious by lawyers of the common law. The inference was that 
equitable intervention undermined the common law because the chancery 
administered an inconsistent discretionary form of justice.25 The discord between 
equity and the common law is unmistakably personified by Shakespeare in Measure 
for Measure through the characters of Angelo and Escalus. Escalus favours notions of 
fairness and consideration of the comprehensive range of facts which make up a 
case, this flexible approach typified the equitable establishment. On the other hand 
Angelo advocated an undeviating black letter approach to the administration of 
justice; an exacting schema typical of the common law.26  
 
1.10. The conflict between equity and law continued throughout the first part of 
the seventeenth century. A now infamous disagreement between Lord Ellesmere of 
the chancery and Coke CJ of the King’s Bench Court forced the King to address the 
matter head on. Resolution was delivered by James I in the Earl of Oxford’s Case.27 
The King ruled that regardless of the fact that equity was a supplementary system 
and one which actually required the existence of the primary common law, in a case 
                                                     
24
 Peter Devonshire, ‘Pre-Emptive Orders against Evasive Dealings: An Assessment of Recent Trends’ 
[2004] JBL 357–377, 374. 
25
 JH Baker and SFC Milsom, Sources of English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 (Butterworths 
1986) 104. 
26
 William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) II ii 79-82.  
27
 The Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Ch Rep 1 [6].  
17 
 
where equity and the law were in conflict, equity would prevail.28 This ruling 
established a significant tenet fundamental to the operation of the English legal 
system. The essence of the judgment which was codified in the Judicature Act 187329 
still endures to this day. Equity’s primacy is rational when you consider the origins of 
the two systems. The common law grew largely out of a body of customs and of the 
precedents laid down by early itinerant judges. Whereas equitable jurisdiction 
derived its mandate from the personhood of the sovereign, thus it is understandable 
that the sovereigns own system should reign above the former.        
 
Parallel jurisdictions 
   
1.11. The previous discussion could feasibly create the impression that the law and 
equity were in a state of constant conflict, a concept which would be misleading.30 
The two institutions did not always construct inconsistent substantive rules, nor 
were the two systems always at odds with one another when adjudging similar 
facts.31 The two institutions generally operated with distinct capacities and in distinct 
areas; equity did not deliberately seek to contradict the common law. Equity’s 
jurisdiction operated in personam and its authority was enforced by means of 
specific remedies. The courts of the common law did not have the jurisdiction to 
grant specific remedies such as injunctions. Contrastingly, the remedy dispensed at 
law was by way of monetary damages, a contrast which demonstrates the two 
evolving systems distinct modus operandi.     
                                                     
28
 Ibid.  
29
 S. 25 (11).  
30
 J Getzler, ‘Patterns of fusion in P Birks (ed), The Classification of obligations (Clarendon Press 
1997) 176-179.  
31
 McGhee (n 6) 9.  
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The stabilisation of the equitable jurisdiction   
 
1.12. Judicial differences were present within equity’s jurisdiction throughout its 
development as well as externally between itself and the law. Throughout the 
seventeenth century concepts of conscience developed and changed as chancery 
lawyers continued to fine tune equity’s technique, a process which invariably 
involved a certain level of judicial vacillation.  On the one hand, prominent 
Chancellors such as Lord Eldon (1801-1827) and his predecessor Lord Hardwicke 
(1737-1756) preferred the rules of systemisation initiated by the earlier Lord 
Nottingham.32 By the twilight of Lord Eldon’s Chancellorship the significant growth of 
the equitable doctrines had settled,33 equitable jurisprudence had advanced to the 
stage where the courts of the Chancery operated by way of reference to established 
rules, principles and precedents. In a manner and form equity had developed a level 
of technical stability and consistency which was more typical of the common law that 
equity stood to supplement. Lord Eldon rebutted assertions that Equity was an 
arbitrary power, free to disregard former precedents and rules. Equity was not to be 
regarded as a capricious force; the doctrines and technique of equity should be ‘well 
settled, and made uniform’.34  
 
1.13. On the other hand, and in contrast to Lord Eldon’s schema, a second concept 
persisted. Kerr and Gee observed that equity was not a static or constant system of 






 Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swans 402 [414].  
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rules applicable to a quantifiable set of circumstances.35 Their opinion was that the 
cases in which equitable jurisdiction were exercised should be considered as 
examples; the judgments thereof are not definitive precedents. The supposition is 
that a strict observance of the established rules, principles and precedents of equity 
is not always appropriate or even possible because as Kerr noted in the late 19th 
century, the evolution of society may necessitate the formulation of new remedies 
suitable for new scenarios,36 a sentiment mirrored in Chapter Three37, one which 
supports the notion that equity is not ‘past the age of child bearing’. A potential 
conciliation of the two schemas therefore is that equity whilst stable should possess 
the innate capacity to be both accommodating and dynamic.      
 
The gradual fusion of equity and the law  
 
1.14. By the close of Lord Eldon’s Chancellorship in the first quarter of the 19th 
century the legal landscape was trite for jurisdictional fusion. The main heads within 
equity’s jurisdiction were well established: the regulation of mortgages and relief 
against forfeiture; guardianship of lunatic’s property; the control of powers and 
trusts; guardianship of infants.38 Rights and titles at law were not disputed, equity 
existed to supplement them, coming to be recognised as a ‘gloss’ on the on the 
law.39 The accepted idea that equity is a supplementary system is underpinned by 
                                                     
35
 William Kerr, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions in Equity (1st edn, William 
Maxwell & Son 1867) 4-5; Steven Gee, Commercial Injunctions (Formerly Mareva Injunctions and 
Anton Pillar Relief) (Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 3. 
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 Kerr (n 35) 4-5.  
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 See Ch 3 para 3.1. 
38
 Maitland (n 14) 17-21. 
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the aforementioned maxim ‘equity follows the law’.40 In the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries the courts of the common law did not commonly entertain a 
title or right of equity, the supposition is that there was a presumption that 
applicants would appeal to the supplementary courts of the Chancery in pursuit of a 
more complete form of justice. In that respect equity and the law could be 
considered to operate on a quasi-symbiotic basis. Nonetheless the reality remained 
that in a case which traversed the two jurisdictions litigants were faced with the 
prospect of dual actions; subsequently the legislature sought to formalise and 
harmonise the quasi-symbiotic interaction between the common law and equity.   
 
1.15. As noted there were clear distinctions between the common law and equity. 
Jurisdictional distinctions and oscillation was becoming a topic which the legislature 
was taking an interest in. What was becoming apparent was that in order to 
ameliorate the jurisdictional difficulties each court would need to be able to deliver a 
‘complete justice’ in each case laid before it. Each court (irrespective of its common 
law or equitable heritage) would need to be able to award both damages and 
injunctive relief in any case which warranted it. The Chancery reform movement was 
mirrored by an equivalent process occurring in the common law domain under the 
umbrella of the Common Law Commissioners. The common law process culminated 
in section 79 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 which authorised the common 
law courts to award injunctive relief against the repetition or continuance of a 
wrong. Injunctive relief could be awarded in addition to any damages ordered in 
respect of a harm which had already occurred. The practicable corollary was that the 
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courts of equity should correspondingly be endowed with the authority to order 
damages in addition to equitable relief; a recommendation which the Chancery 
Commission made in its third report of 1856:  
 
1.16. “We are of opinion that in all cases in which a 
Court of Equity interferes by injunction it should have 
jurisdiction to give compensation in damages for the 
injury done in addition to restraining the commission of 
the injury for the future, and that such damages should 
be given although the act complained of may have 
produced not profit for the wrongdoer”.41   
 
1.17. Looking broadly at the parallel reform movements occurring in the common 
law courts and the Chancery as discussed above it is apparent that although they 
marked progress, they did not offer perfect solutions. Under the Section 82 of the 
Common Law Procedure Act 1854 a common law court could grant an ex parte 
inunction at any point in time once an action had been brought but its availability 
was dependent on there being a subsisting power to grant damages at common law. 
Therefore the courts of the common law did not have the jurisdiction to order an 
injunction to enforce a right which was only recognised by equity, nor did they have 
the jurisdiction to restrain anticipated or threatened wrongs when no past wrong 
could be established. The simple reason for this prohibition was that where a 
common law court could not establish an existing cause in damages it could not 
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grant an injunction. Contrastingly the Chancery Court’s intervention was permissible 
even where there was a mere threat of infringement upon some legal or equitable 
right; at equity an injunction could be granted quia timet. 
 
1.18. The jurisdiction to grant an injunction quia timet was dependent upon there 
being some evidence to indicate that some wrongful act would be committed in the 
future. The perceived threat of a potential transgression unaccompanied by a wrong 
in the past was actually the most common cause of bills seeking injunctions in 
equity.42 Significantly, the jurisdiction to grant injunctions quia timet did not demand 
of an applicant the burden of establishing that a future transgression was a certainty 
rather that it was very likely. Furthermore In a case where a past wrong could be 
established, in order for a quia timet injunction to be granted an applicant still had to 
show some genuine threat suggesting that a transgression would occur in the 
future.43 By its nature the Mareva injunction is quia timet at work; operating on the 
basis of the perceived threat that amenable assets may be dissipated. 
 
Simplifying persisting Jurisdictional complexities   
1.19. The old Courts of the Chancery were invariably petitioned with requests to 
order an injunction to support a contractual right, but not the specific performance 
of that contract. Convolutedly the contractual right in question had to be tried in a 
court of the common law, while a Court of the Chancery could grant an injunction in 
the interim period between the action commencing in the common law court and 
the judgment thereof. Alternatively a perpetual injunction could be ordered 
                                                     
42
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following validation at the trial of a contractual right in the common law court. The 
status quo was simplified somewhat following a statutory provision which compelled 
judges in the High Court of Chancery and the Court of the Chancery of the County 
Palatine of Lancaster to adjudge the merits of the underlying action itself rather than 
refer the matter to the Common law Courts.44      
  
The Judicature Acts: a fused jurisdiction 
  
1.20. In 1869 a commission was established to simplify conclusively the bifurcated 
bureaucratic procedures that many believed hindered the judicial process. The 
Judicature Reform Commission of 1869 concluded that previously discussed 
attempts to clarify and simplify jurisdictional confusion had largely failed and 
proposed more fundamental reforms.45 The principal proposition of the Commission 
was that the cumbersome systems of Equity and the Law should converge creating a 
new fused jurisdiction.46 The crystallisation of the recommendations of the 
Judicature Reform Commission was effected by the Judicature Acts47 which created a 
unified Supreme Court of Judicature.  
 
1.21. The Judicature Acts by and large codified the Earl of Oxford’s case judgment, 
legislating for the combined administration of equity and the law with clear protocol 
                                                     
44
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for situations where a conflict arose between the two systems.48 The formative 
legislation stipulated that where equity and the law were in conflict the former 
would prevail.49 Ten specific instances were listed and significantly to the discourse 
herein, one such instance was the power of granting injunctions and appointing 
receivers.50 The united administration of the Supreme Court directed to administer 
the fused jurisdiction comprised the Court of Appeal and the High Court sub-divided 
into five divisions, later three. As each Division was now statutorily bound to 
recognise defences in equity the common injunction became defunct and was 
abolished accordingly.51 Although in theory the result of disputes set before the new 
Supreme Court would be the same as prior to the Judicature Acts; the modification 
was the elimination of the moribund meandering route to justice.      
 
The effect of the Judicature Acts upon the availability of injunctions  
 
1.22. The Judicature Acts altered the procedure for obtaining an injunction, 
henceforth a writ of injunction was no longer to be issued, and an injunction was 
obtainable by judgment or order only. The Act of 1873 vested the former jurisdiction 
of the Court of the Chancery into the High Court of Justice and a new additional 
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief was created under s 25(8) of the 1875 Act. 
Under the new provision injunctions could be obtained by an interlocutory court 
order in every case where it was apparent to the court that it was ‘just or convenient’ 
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to do so.52 This jurisdictional expansion marks a significant development towards the 
growth of the subject matter of this discourse; it is fundamental to the development 
of the modern day freezing injunction. 
 
1.23. It shall become apparent in the following chapter that the statutory 
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief is wide, however it does not tender an 
unfettered prerogative to be applied wherever a court sees fit. Injunctive relief can 
only be granted by the court where an applicant can demonstrate a right in law or 
equity.53 Alternatively, in the case of anti-suit injunctions an applicant must 
demonstrate some actual conduct or threat of conduct by the other party to 
proceedings which either is or would be considered to be unconscionable.54 The 
same is true of the Mareva jurisdiction55, for example where there is a real risk that a 
defendant may remove an impugned asset from the UK in order to defeat an order in 
the future the courts may act to defeat such potential frustration. Gee claims that 
while the new legislative jurisdiction was, on the face of it a statutory innovation, in 
truth the old equitable principles and ratios which governed their jurisdiction were 
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not rendered obsolete. But then again neither did they offer answers to new 




1.24. At this stage it is appropriate simply to comment that it has been 
demonstrated that the principles of equity stand as one of the principal foundations 
of the English legal system. Even in their modern form it is important to acknowledge 
that the heritage of equitable principles can be found in the function of the medieval 
Court of Chancery and the exploratory techniques of the Chancellors. It has been 
established that opinions have varied in relation to the principles of equity, and 
whilst equity is not a capricious jurisdiction it is generally accepted that equity is 
about the business of preventing unconscionable conduct. Equity can be considered 
to supplement the law and as such equitable remedies including injunctions, operate 
to ensure that the spirit of justice is upheld; to guarantee that the authority of the 
court is not rendered impotent. Since times immemorial equity has been valued 
precisely for the reason that it was not constrained by the same rigid obedience to 
custom or the doctrine of judicial precedent as the common law. Conceptually that 
comparative freedom facilitates the purposeful pursuit of the spirit of justice; a 
submission which forms a fundamental facet of the discourse which follows. In the 
following chapter it shall become apparent that the development of the Mareva 
jurisdiction is paradigmatic of the idea that equitable remedies can evolve in order to 
fortify the integrity of the court’s process. Processes which could otherwise be 
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thwarted by dishonest defendants or uncompromising bureaucratic obstacles. At its 
heart equity is about remedies; the Mareva injunction preserves the likelihood of an 
effective remedy by ring fencing amenable assets. It will become apparent that 
equitable principles and techniques can be extremely effective when used to protect 
the spirt of justice in practice.   
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2.1. In the previous chapter the equitable jurisdiction was surveyed and it was 
established that the Mareva injunction was a creature of equity. The implications of 
that submission were discussed in terms of the objects of equity, namely the pursuit 
of the spirit of justice and the prevention of unconscionable conduct. The relative 
autonomy available to the courts when exercising an equitable jurisdiction when 
compared to the law was also established to be significant. In this chapter the focus 
narrows fixing its sights upon the development of the Mareva jurisdiction. This 
discussion addresses the application of equitable techniques in practice. The 
discourse builds upon the foundations laid in chapter one, seeking to demonstrate 
how the peculiar equitable jurisdiction facilitated a shift away from the restrictive 
traditional English positon which barred Mareva relief towards the modern formative 
position which allows a claimant to obtain a freezing order where there is a real risk 
that a defendant may abscond or remove assets from the jurisdiction which are 
required to satisfy a debt. This objective is achieved through a discussion of relevant 
case law as well as an evaluation of the judicial rationale which shaped this area of 
law. Certain other considerations are also discussed and held to be key, such as the 
nature of the emerging modern business world in the nineteen-seventies, inclusive 
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of technological advancements which amplified the potential for a debtor to evade 
his obligations to a creditor.     
 
What is a Mareva Injunction?  
 
2.2. Mareva Injunctions must be contrasted with an order for the detention, 
custody or preservation of an interest in property (whether real property, movable 
property, fungible property or monies) made with the intention of ensuring that a 
final order of the court is effective. Such an order can be issued pursuant to the rules 
of the court when appropriate or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of that court. 
A Mareva Injunction is a different creature, deriving its name from the case which for 
more than two decades tendered its namesake, Mareva Compania Naviera SA v 
International Bulkcarriers SA1 In its current form a ‘Mareva Injunction’ (later referred 
to as a ‘freezing injunction’ or ‘freezing order’ pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR): Part 25 and Practice Direction 25A) is a term which is commonly used to 
denote a particular form of injunction which is granted as a means to prevent the 
removal of impugned assets from the jurisdiction or from dissipating, disposing of or 
dealing with the assets within the jurisdiction in any manner or form which would 
have the effect of frustrating the execution under proceedings brought by an 
applicant.2   
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The traditional position 
  
2.3. By the 19th Century it was the established practice that a court of equity 
would not grant an injunction to a creditor preventing a debtor from dealing with 
their property if that creditor was not able to establish a legal or equitable right or 
interest in that property.3 Consequently, a person who wished to apply for relief on 
the basis of their claim to be a creditor could not file a bill with a Chancery Court to 
obtain an injunction based on the supposition that they were ‘going’ to be defrauded 
by way of the defendant ‘making away with its assets’.4 The implication was that 
there was no jurisdiction which could allow a court to order analogous injunctive 
relief. No suggestion of a defect in power arose; if such injunctions were ordered 
then a court would have exercised the same powers employed to enforce other 
equitable orders. It is apparent that equitable jurisprudence directed that in 
scenarios where relief of this kind was solicited it was on balance inappropriate, 
unconscionable or unjust to obstruct the defendant’s right to deal with his or her 
property as he or she wished to. Although it follows that if an applicant could 
evidence a legal or an equitable right or interest attached to the impugned property 
then the general principles would be applicable and an applicant could act upon that 
proprietary right in and of itself.  
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Innovative legal thinking    
 
2.4. As inventive lawyers tested the waters in the aftermath of the Judicature Acts 
the judiciary issued repeated statements that prior to a judgment the High Court did 
not have the authority to restrain a person from dealing with or removing their 
assets from the domestic jurisdiction. Prior to the emergence of the Mareva 
jurisdiction in 1975 the lack of any practical or justiciable way to stop a non-resident 
of this country from frustrating an order of the court by removing impugned assets in 
order to frustrate a potential judgment was a status quo which was receiving 
legislative attention and jurisprudential criticism. The Supreme Court Practice and 
Procedure Committee Final Report5 contained the proposition that the writ of ne 
exeat regno which restrained a defendant from fleeing the jurisdiction should be 
extended and made available post-judgment to stop a sentenced debtor from fleeing 
the jurisdiction and evading the obligations owed to his creditor.6 It was in hindsight 
a forward thinking recommendation however it was not pursued at the time. 
Megarry J stated in Felton v Callis7 that the writ ne exeat regno was categorically not 
available for application where the sole purpose was the preservation of assets 
within the jurisdiction. Although Megarry J did comment obiter that it would be 
advisable to consider legislative intervention in this area, echoing the comments of 
the Committee on the Supreme Court Practice and Procedure. Evidently legislative or 
judicial action to combat the problem of fleeing or evasive debtors was increasingly 
called for.  
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2.5. Suffice to say that the aforementioned judicial preference has changed and it 
is now trite law that the Mareva injunction may be ordered in appropriate 
circumstances. The development of the Mareva jurisdiction is in many respects a 
product of that symbiotic relationship between the law and equity discussed in 
chapter one. That is to say that it is an area where equity intervened in order to 
supplement the common law; to achieve a ‘more perfect justice’.8 McGrath observes 
that the Mareva jurisdiction was inaugurated and developed primarily by judges to 
protect an applicant’s interest’s pre-trial.9 That submission aligns closely with the 
essence of the maxim ‘equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’.10 A 
defect in the law was evident and equity intervened to realise the effective 
administration of justice.  
 
Case law development: the conception of the Mareva injunction   
 
2.6. It has been argued that a growing number of lawyers and litigants expressed 
a persisting desire for the creation of a Mareva jurisdiction. In the discussion which 
follows attentions concentrate on the body of case law which established that 
jurisdiction. The intention is to look at the material facts of the cases which follow, to 
identify similarities or differences, to look at common themes and to explore the 
judicial reasoning which facilitated the formation of this area of law. It will become 
apparent that whilst the Mareva jurisdiction is now beyond doubt, its institution was 
not without reservation or equivocation.  
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The Karageorgis Case  
 
2.7. The case in which a freezing injunction was first granted was actually Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis.11 The applicants in the case, Nippon Yusen Kaisha were a 
large Japanese ship owning company. Nippon made charterparties with the 
defendants who were named George Karageorgis and John Karageorgis. The 
defendants chartered three vessels from the big Japanese ship-owners, the hire 
thereof was payable by the Karageorgis’ who claimed to have transmitted funds to 
make good their bargain to New York. The transmission of those funds was disputed 
as the payment never materialised and Nippon was left without the monies owed to 
them. Attempts by Nippon to locate the defendants failed; it appeared that they had 
vacated their offices in Piraeus.12  
 
2.8. Having received no payment, the Japanese ship-owners considered their 
options and enquiries were made to ascertain if any assets existed that they may be 
able to target in recompense. It was established that the Karageorgis’ had funds 
located in a bank account in London; funds which Nippon hoped could be called 
upon to satisfy the debt owed to them. Nippon reasonably feared that the absente 
defendants could with all right remove the impugned assets from the jurisdiction. 
The removal thereof would leave Nippon with no recourse for justice.13 For that 
reason they sought an interim injunction against the defendants to prohibit either of 
the two from disposing of or removing the money from the bank account which was 
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within the English jurisdiction. Such preventive measures could notionally be 
effected by placing a bank that held the funds on notice, ordering them not to 
release the funds to the defendants until further instruction from the courts, or 
otherwise risk being held in contempt of court.     
    
2.9. Lord Denning MR commented that it had never been the practice of the 
English courts to seize the assets of a defendant before a judgment had been given 
or to stop a person disposing of their assets as they saw fit; a locus standi at odds 
with conventional continental practices.14 Lord Denning MR observed that there was 
a convincing prima facie case that the hire remained unpaid by either of the two 
defendants. The removal of the impugned assets would have made it almost 
impossible for the ship-owners to recover anything from absente charterers. It was 
the consideration of those points that convinced the Court of Appeal to grant what 
was (in domestic terms at least) an innovative order. The court established the 
jurisdiction under s 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 
which repeated the essence of s 25 (8) of the Judicature Act 1875:   
‘A mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a 
receiver appointer by an interlocutory Order of the 
Court in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to 
be just or convenient’.15  
The Court of Appeal agreed unanimously that the relief should be granted and the 
charterers restrained from frustrating a potential judgment by removing the funds 
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from the bank accounts held in London.16 That order was practically effected in the 
manner and form notionally outlined above, by way of a mandamus of sorts 
operative upon the London bank requiring it not to allow the defendants access to 
their funds.  
 
The Mareva case   
 
2.10. Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarries SA17 is widely 
regarded as a landmark judgment, not least because it is the case from which the 
Mareva injunction derived its namesake. Nonetheless, the immediate past discussion 
demonstrates that in reality it was the Karageorgis18 case in which the injunction so 
labelled ‘Mareva’ was first granted. That the injunction takes its name from a later 
case of the same year is perhaps misleading. The judgment is nonetheless important 
because it supported the Karageorgis judgment, further establishing the legitimacy 
and the utility of the Mareva injunction. In the Mareva case the Court of Appeal 
were asked to extend an injunction granted by Donaldson J which was due to expire 
on the same day that the Court of Appeal was sitting. It is noteworthy that 
Donaldson J was also the judge of the first instance in the Karageorgis case in which 
he had refused to grant the injunction sought, a decision which was reversed by the 
Court of Appeal. Contrastingly in the Mareva case Donaldson J granted the injunction 
(although not without reservation) until the end of the working day on the 23rd June 
1975 - a strategically chosen time and date. The date was stipulated precisely 
because that was the day on which the Court of Appeal subsequently heard the case. 
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Donaldson J was anticipating that by taking such action the Court of Appeal would be 
compelled to entertain certain questions which he felt ought to be addressed in 
relation to the new contentious form of injunction.19   
 
2.11. Like the Karageorgis case, the applicants in the Mareva case were also ship-
owners. They let a vessel named the Mareva to the defendants who were the 
charterers. The charter was for the purpose of return voyage to the Far East based 
on a daily rate beginning from the time of the vessels delivery to the charterers with 
payment being due half monthly in advance. The defendants proceeded to sub-
charter the vessel to the President of India. The Indian party loaded the vessel with 
fertiliser which was consigned to India, payment being made by the Indian High 
Commission at the request of the defendants to a bank in London in the name of the 
defendants. The total sum paid by the High Commission was some £174,000. The 
defendants made good the first two instalments of half-monthly hire due by credit 
which was transferred to the applicant ship-owners. However the third instalment 
was not made as agreed and correspondences between the applicants and the 
defendants clearly indicated that the defendants were not able or willing to honour 
their obligations under the charter to make payment. The defendants also indicated 
that they were no longer able to meet any other obligations made under the charter 
nor were they able to secure any financial support which may enable them to pay 
their dues.      
 
2.12. The applicants understandably regarded the conduct of the defendants as 
repudiation of the charter. A writ was issued claiming the unpaid hire of their vessel 
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and damages for the repudiation, which Lord Denning MR commented would in all 
likelihood amount to a substantial sum. The applicants served that writ upon the 
defendants agents present within the English jurisdiction and at the time of the 
appeal were in the process of applying for service out of the jurisdiction upon the 
defendants too. In such a scenario the trial thereof may provide recompense for the 
injured party, but significantly an award of money is of no value in the absence of 
any monies or assets owned by the defendants which may targeted for payment. By 
way of analogy - an order of the court for payment of monies is only beneficial so 
long as the defendant has money in his piggy bank.   
 
The relevance of the Lister case to the Mareva jurisdiction 
2.13. Lord Denning MR briefly commented upon the reservations that Donaldson J 
had expressed in relation to certain remarks made by Cotton LJ in the in the Lister & 
Co v Stubbs judgment.20 Donaldson J was of the opinion that the Court of Appeal 
should have been directed to the Lister judgment in the Karageorgis case. In Lister, 
Cotton LJ asserted that in a scenario where a court could see that on the face of it an 
applicant would in all likelihood be able to establish that a debt was owed by 
bringing an action, no security thereon can be exacted until final judgment or 
decree.21 The essence of Cotton LJ’s declaratory statement was that a court cannot 
take action to protect a creditor until the final judgment is delivered. Lindley LJ noted 
in Lister that if a court took such interim action they would in essence be stretching 
the limits of the law to the extent that they would be doing the work of the 
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legislature.22 In the light of the Lister line of argument Roskill LJ commented obiter 
that ‘if necessary’ the terms of the charter could be called upon as grounds for 
distinguishing the Mareva case from Lister. Whereas Lord Denning MR was 
somewhat more dismissive of Lister, citing statutory authority as the means to justify 
the jurisdiction to grant the novel form of interim relief.23  
 
 
2.14. The Lister authority is now beyond doubt a dubious one. Indeed the Supreme 
Court of Justice recently stated in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar 
Capital Partners LLC24 that the judgment in Lister, and the earlier judgment in 
Metropolitan Bank v Heiron25 upon which Lister was partially based were both 
misguided, Lord Neuberger (SCP) acknowledged that in those two cases ‘the law took 
a wrong turn’.26 It is worth commenting that even if the judgment in Lister were 
sound it would be hard to reconcile its effect with a case such as Mareva because as 
Lord Neuberger (SCP) would have conceivably observed if he were presiding in 
Mareva, the case was not concerned with a bribe or secret commission.27 Ultimately 
the Supreme Court stated that any decision which was made in reliance upon Lister 
or Heiron should be overruled.28 Of course when exercising jurisdiction in Mareva 
Lord Denning MR did not possess powers of foresight which would allow him to 
consider the future erudite judgment of Lord Neuberger in the FHR case nor did he 
scrutinise the Lister judgment at length himself. He felt that it was sufficient for him 
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to cite the relevant statutory authority which established his prerogative to make the 
order.29   
 
Was it right to grant the relief?  
2.15. In Beddow v Beddow30 Sir George Jessel MR construed s. 45 of the Judicature 
Act 1925 (repeating s. 25(8) Supreme Court Judicature Act 1875), to the extreme 
ends that it bestowed an ‘unlimited power to grant an injunction in any case where it 
would be right or just to do so’.31 Meaning that the statutory provision did not give a 
judge an unfettered discretion to grant an injunction but in accord with the law. 
Ultimately as Lord Denning MR noted, although the statutory provision tenders wide 
power upon the court, an applicant must be able to establish a right in equity or the 
law in order for a court to consider granting an injunction.32 Significantly, a court 
could only grant a Mareva order to protect an applicant’s right once that right is 
proven to exist.33 Denning did not dispute the correctness of that status quo; 
stretching it conceptually he claimed that the principle can be extended to apply to a 
creditor who asserts a right to be paid where a debt is outstanding, even before that 
right has been established absolutely by way of a judgment.34 Furthermore, such a 
case is strengthened where there is a palpable risk that the party owing the debt may 
defeat a potential judgment by disposing of the assets.   
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2.16. Lord Denning MR’s reasoning was pragmatic and based upon the reality that 
the defendant charterers possessed monies held in their name with a London bank 
and that in the absence of an order to the contrary the charterers may with all right 
remove those funds from the English jurisdiction. In which case the owners of the 
Mareva would be left without recompense having discharged their end of the 
bargain, which Roskill LJ agreed would constitute a ‘grave injustice’. An injustice 
which the court could avoid by extending the injunction until the trial of matter or 
another order.35 While Roskill LJ did stress the importance of judicial restraint when 
considering this emerging area of commercial law, on the whole he agreed with the 
leading judgment of Lord Denning MR, as did Ormrod LJ.        
 
The first inter parties challenge 
2.17. Rasu Maritima SA v Perusahaan Pertambangan is important for a number of 
reasons, not least because it was the first Mareva case in which the defendant party 
was represented, allowing for a more fruitful discourse to ensue than was the case in 
either Karageorgis or Mareva. Mr Mustill Q.C acting for the defendants questioned 
the correctness of the judgments in both Karageorgis and Mareva. He put it to the 
court that it had no jurisdiction to grant Mareva relief in the first place.36 If the 
jurisdiction to grant the relief was, as counsel for the defendants suggested an 
erroneous jurisdiction then the order of such relief in this case would be incorrect 
also. Lord Denning MR addressed the doubts in relation to the jurisdiction to grant 
Mareva relief primarily by dispelling notions that it was an entirely new jurisdiction 
to England. He outlined an old process which was referred to as ‘foreign 
                                                     
35
 Ibid [216].  
36
 Rasu Maritima SA v Perusahaan Pertambangan [1978] QB 644 [648]-[649].  
41 
 
attachment’;37 a process which was described by William Bohun in 1723,38 and later 
amended by Alexander Pulling in 1842.39 Although the process of foreign attachment 
was evidently older than that, according to Pulling’s account the process ‘prevailed at 
a very early period in London, as in other Roman provinces’ what’s more it still 
persisted ‘in other ancient cities and towns in England, such as Bristol, Exeter, 
Lancaster as well as in Scotland’.40  
 
Foreign Attachment   
2.18. Gee cites the custom of ‘foreign attachment’ as a possible basis for the 
development and expansion of the Mareva jurisdiction. Foreign attachment was a 
device which was utilised within the City of London by merchants and mercantile 
courts from the late fourteen hundreds onwards. The discussion which follows about 
the old but elapsed process of foreign attachment demonstrates that far from being 
a continental import or modern judicial fabrication, the jurisdiction to grant Mareva 
relief arguably constituted a customary judicial resurgence of sorts.     
 
2.19. By way of the custom, a citizen of the City of London could make an 
application to the Court of the Mayor and Aldermen of London in relation to an 
unsatisfied debt. If it was not possible to locate the defendant or if the defendant 
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court then the applicant could attach any of the 
defendant’s assets that were within the jurisdiction of the court. Such assets 
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included, but were not limited to monies, goods or even third party debts owed to 
the defendant. Pursuant to the proper procedure’s being followed and after such 
time as the court believed that the defendant would not make good the debt 
because he had failed to stand before the court, the court would order the appraisal 
of his goods so that sufficient monies could be located or other goods located and 
delivered to the applicant to be held and or liquidated to satisfy the amount owing.41 
In order to receive the defendant’s goods, the applicant was obliged to offer security 
to the end that should the defendant stand before the court within a period of a year 
and a day following the court’s order and prove that he in fact owed no such debt to 
the applicant at the time the application was made, or that he owed only a part of 
the debt, the applicant would make restitution thereof. The debt had to be due 
within the City of London and the defendant had to be considered to be a foreigner, 
that is to say ‘not civic’ and therefore falling outside of the jurisdiction of the London 
Court. Foreign attachment did not require as modern presumption may suggest that 
the defendant should be a non-domestic resident of England simply a non-domestic 
resident of that court’s jurisdiction.  
 
2.20. By the mid eighteen-hundreds foreign attachment had come to be regarded 
as a biased and questionable process. Some commentators had come to believe that 
the procedure, which enabled a court to exercise its jurisdiction in the absence of a 
defendant was contrary to the prevailing notion of natural justice. Furthermore the 
process was fraught with difficulties in relation to the jurisdiction of the London 
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court.42 Consequently the procedure became gradually less popular and eventually 
fell into disuse. It is however a device which remained popular in other common law 
jurisdictions, particularly in the United States of America43 where the Supreme Court 
still utilises the doctrine today, albeit in a limited capacity.44 Nonetheless in Rasu 
Lord Denning MR observed that on the continent of Europe and in particular in 
maritime towns and ports the process labelled ‘saisie conservatoire’ (a French term) 
is commonplace, where it facilitates the seizure of assets to preserve them for the 
benefit of a creditor.45 The fact that analogous processes (whether by one name or 
another) were common throughout Europe and other common law jurisdictions 
constituted further cause in the mind of Lord Denning MR that it should be 
incorporated into the law of England both pragmatically and as part of the 
harmonisation of the laws of the member states of the common market pursuant to 
the requirements of the Treaty of Rome.46   
        
Did the emerging Mareva jurisdiction constitute a mischief? 
2.21. As noted, it stood as established practice for a long while that a court would 
not before an order or judgment permit a creditor to seize money or goods 
belonging to a debtor. Conventionally, a creditor’s proper remedy was to secure a 
judgment by way of an RSC Order 14 and thereby trigger the issue of bankruptcy 
proceedings against a debtor. Now within those proceedings lay a remedy; a 
conveyance or preference based upon a fraud, intended to defeat a creditor could be 
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set aside. Thus the judgment thereof could facilitate the retrospective re-
crystallisation of funds upon which recompense could be levied – a status quo 
reinforced by considerable precedence. Until the judgment in Rasu the threshold test 
for Mareva relief was seemingly that an applicant would be able to obtain a 
summary judgment under RSC Order 14.47     
 
2.22. Overcoming the obstacles of the apparent restrictive status quo Lord Denning 
MR pointed out that none of the prohibitive statements prior to Karageorgis relating 
to a prohibition upon restraining a person from dealing with his property before a 
judgment or order was made in point of fact related to a scenario where a defendant 
was absent from the jurisdiction but had assets in the jurisdiction. It is in relation to 
that distinct scenario that Lord Denning MR considered it to be right that the old 
custom of foreign attachment should make a resurgence; by way of the modern 
interlocutory injunction permitted by the jurisdiction purposefully legislated for 
under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 section 25 (8).48   
 
2.23. Section 25 (8) is a provision which Lord Denning MR considered to bestow 
discretion upon a judge; however certain judgments had the effect of impressing 
restrictions upon judicial autonomy. The judicial restrictions upon the interpretation 
of this provision may have been tendered in North London Railway Co. v Great 
Northern Railway Co by the Court of Appeal in 1883 in which limiting statements 
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upon the autonomy to dispense injunctive relief were made.49 On the other hand as 
discussed earlier, the sentiments of Sir George Jessel MR50 some five years previously 
in Beddow heralded autonomy and discretion, holding them to be key to a Court’s 
utility.51 The relative freedom which was fundamental to Lord Denning MR’s 
development of the Mareva jurisdiction is a feature of the English legal landscape 
which receives mixed reviews domestically. Although it should be noted that in 
common law jurisdictions where similar judicial interpretive freedom is 
constitutionally constrained that freedom is sometimes envied or sought after 
because where the development of a remedy to address a new problem would be 
advantageous, the judiciary’s hands are tied until legislative intervention, which may 
take considerable time.52     
 
2.24. As discussed in Chapter One it was once the case that the jurisdiction of the 
courts of equity to grant injunctive relief was constrained and limited, not by statute, 
but by the practice of different Chancellors.53 Sir George Jessel MR made declaratory 
statements that an essential function of a Court of Justice is the ability to restrain 
wrongful acts.54 That utility was in his opinion unconstrained quite intentionally by 
the legislature by way of certain statutory provisions.  
2.25. The Common Law Procedure Act 1854 s 79 states that:  
‘In all cases of breach of contract or other injury, where 
the party injured is entitled to maintain and has brought 
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an action, he may… claim a writ of injunction against 
the repetition or continuance of such breach of 
contract, or other injury, or the committal of any breach 
of contract or injury of a like kind, arising out of the 
same contract or relating to the same property or right’. 
 
2.26. Section 81 of the same Act provided that ‘in such action judgment may be 
given by the writ of injunction’ as a Judge considers to be right in accordance with 
the law. The eighty-first provision was bolstered by the eighty-second which 
permitted the applicant to petition the court for ex parte injunctive relief which 
could be granted where a Judge considered it to be reasonable and just, that being 
the only limit upon the jurisdiction. According to Sir George Jessel MR the 
discretionary jurisdiction to grant injunctions was fortified by s. 25(8) of the 
Judicature Act 1875 and far from being a mischief the judicial discretion therein was 
intended to be a manifest feature of the legal landscape henceforth.55 Sir George 
Jessel MR stated:56 
2.27. ‘It appears to me that the only limit to my 
power of granting an injunction is whether I can 
properly do so. For that is what it amounts to. In my 
opinion, having regard to these two Acts of Parliament, 
I have unlimited power to grant an injunction in any 
case where it would be right or just to do so: and what 
is right or just must be decided, not by the caprice of 
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the Judge, but according to sufficient legal reason or on 
settled legal principles.’ 
 
2.28. Thus in Rasu Lord Denning MR was maintaining the jurisdiction to grant 
injunctive relief and declaring that it should not be impeded by rigid rules of the 
court or limiting statements;57 rather the courts should retain and employ the wide 
discretion to grant an interlocutory injunction in the manner envisioned by Sir 
George Jessel MR.58 Such submissions support the aforementioned concept that 
equity should work not in accordance with the strictness of the letter of the law, but 
the spirit of the law.59 It is submitted that the jurisdiction to grant Mareva relief does 
justice to both the letter of the law as embodied by s. 25(8) JA 1875 and the concepts 
of fairness and justice which underpin the spirit of the law and the essence of equity.   
 
Mareva relief – part of an evolutionary process  
2.29. The emerging Mareva jurisdiction is emblematic of the comments made in 
chapter one that equity must possess the latent ability to evolve,60 it is submitted 
that Karageorgis and Mareva were part of that equitable ‘evolutionary process’.61 
Equity possesses the capacity to fill the gaps in the law and the Mareva jurisdiction is 
an example of judges working to exercise jurisdiction in the way they consider that 
the law maker would have intended if he were presiding in the same case.62 Huntley 
and Halliday recognise that modern financial structures continually develop, 
becoming increasingly more complex and sophisticated therefore they agree that the 
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law should evolve and adapt to address those new challenges as they arise.63 The 
import is that it is both just and convenient that Mareva relief was granted in 
Karageorgis and Mareva even on an ex parte application basis because a feature of 
the modern business landscape in the 1970s was the emerging reality that a debtor 
could ‘by a single telex or telegraphic message, deprive’ a creditor of those monies to 
which he was entitled.64 Therefore it is manifestly important that a defendant is not 
aware that they are under suspicion until an order has been served.  
 
2.30. Nevertheless in ex parte proceedings there is no opportunity for an 
adversarial discourse; only the applicant has the opportunity to present their case 
and that fact is contentious.65 In consideration of the respondent’s disadvantage the 
threshold for ex parte relief is higher than is the case of inter parties relief and the 
courts commonly require of the applicant a cross-undertaking in damages.66 The 
courts may also insist that a cross-undertaking is ‘fortified’ by way of security before 
an order is granted.67 Furthermore, it is noted that once an order has been granted, a 
respondent may apply to the courts to have that order discharged where there are 
justifiable grounds to do so. Being mindful of the abovementioned considerations 
the legitimacy of ex parte Mareva relief appears to be both justified and pragmatic; 
the courts are careful to balance and protect the interests of both parties. 
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Widening the scope of relief   
2.31. As mentioned earlier the Rasu judgment is significant because it affirmed the 
judgments in Karageorgis and Mareva but it also provided a wider threshold for 
relief. It is repeated that both Karageorgis and Mareva were cases in which a 
summary judgment could have been obtained under RSC Order 14. However Lord 
Denning MR asserted that the jurisdiction to grant Mareva relief should not be 
limited to instances falling under an Order 14 scenario but rather where the 
applicant can demonstrate that he has a ‘good arguable case’68 - in line with the test 
applied to serve outside of the jurisdiction.69 In addition to delimiting the threshold 
to establish a claim, Rasu widened the range of assets upon which Mareva relief 
could be served from funds held in bank accounts (as in Karageorgis and Mareva) to 
encompass other goods. That extension can be considered to be both practical and 
necessary when one considers the supposition that capital held as money can be 
transferred into other goods: movables such as gold or diamonds; fungible goods 
such as shares in a public company; a chose in action such as shares in a private 
company; or conceivably real property in the form of land. Hence Lord Denning MR 
remarked that it would be permissible to allow an injunction of this nature to stand 
against property other than money such as machinery, materials and plant held at 
port as was the case in Rasu. Lord Denning MR’s extension was cautiously supported 
by Orr LJ.70  
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2.32. Incidentally the appeal was dismissed in Rasu and injunctive relief bared, but 
the dismissal was largely due to proprietary questions as to who held title over the 
impugned assets as well as their availability for retrieval if relocated out of the 
jurisdiction.71 Relief was not barred because of any deficiency in the jurisdiction. The 
Rasu case is significant because it was the first time that a Mareva injunction was 
challenged on an inter party basis which facilitated a more balanced adversarial and 
productive discourse. The case identified an analogous device utilised centuries prior 
in the city of London, amongst the maritime ports of England and across the coastal 
regions of continental Europe, dispelling submissions that Mareva relief was an 
entirely foreign concept to this jurisdiction. Perhaps most importantly, the judgment 
in Rasu further fortified the validity of the Mareva jurisdiction establishing solid 
foundations upon which an order could be made. Furthermore it widened the 
availability and scope of relief which was increasingly pertinent and beneficial in the 
emerging technologically developing business community.  
 
Mareva Jurisdiction for English Residents? 
 
2.33. During the first half of this Chapter it was established that the Mareva 
jurisdiction was appropriate for cases where the defendant was a non-resident of the 
domestic jurisdiction. The Mareva injunction was primarily restrained to situations 
where there was a perceived threat that such a party may remove their assets from 
the domestic jurisdiction and thereby nullify an order of the court. The rationale for 
this position was that if a defendant or his assets were beyond the reach of an 
English court then any judicial recourse would entail an extraterritorial dimension; 
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enforcement would usually require that the foreign jurisdiction’s authorities 
cooperate in order to exact justice. It was comparatively more straight-forward to 
freeze that non-residents assets held within the jurisdiction than to pursue them 
extraterritorially.  On the contrary, if a defendant is an English resident, that party 
falls within the reach of the English courts thus enabling an in personam action. 
Consequently, it remained disputed as to whether the Mareva jurisdiction could 
extend to encompass English nationals who were also resident within the 
jurisdiction.  It had previously been postulated that if a party could be served in the 
jurisdiction then Mareva relief could not apply. 
 
The van Weelde case  
 
2.34. In Van Weelde Scheepvaart Kantoor BV v Homeric Marine Services Ltd72 the 
court were petitioned by a company who chartered their vessel out to a resident 
English company who were engaged in the transportation of sugar to the Nigerian 
capital. The charterers took longer than was considered to be acceptable by the 
owners of the vessel to discharge the cargo at the port in Lagos; a considerable delay 
for which the applicants sought damages. The owners of the vessel sought after a 
Mareva injunction to operate upon the English resident defendants’ assets until the 
final judgment was delivered to ensure that reparations would be available if that 
judgment were favourable. Ultimately the granting of Mareva relief in such a 
scenario was held to be contrary to what the court considered to be settled English 
practice. The court interpreted comments which appeared to be to the contrary in 
                                                     
72
 Gebr Van Weelde Scheepavaart Kantoor BV v Homeric Marine Services Ltd, The Agrabele [1979] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 117.  
52 
 
Rasu as an indication of what the Court of Appeal thought the law ought to be and 
not a declaratory statement of what the law was.  
 
The Daklouche case  
 
2.35. The question regarding defendants who were resident within the jurisdiction 
sparked a brief period of judicial development. In Chartered Bank v Daklouche73 
there was a primary appraisal of the problem of jurisdictional residency. The 
defendants were a Lebanese husband and wife partnership, the Daklouches. The 
husband was the principal trader and his businesses had prospered on the back of 
the oil boom in Abu Dhabi and the Persian Gulf. For the main part he was engaged in 
supply of food and drinks wholesale to airports and other caterers and retail goods to 
the public but his wife assisted in the day to day running of the retail business. The 
wife relocated to England where a large house was bought and conveyed into her 
name.74 The husband opened a business account with the Abu Dhabi Chartered Bank 
in the name of his company (both he and his wife had full power to operate that 
account). The husband’s company fell into financial difficulty and the Abu Dhabi bank 
account became extremely overdrawn. The husband promised his bank manager 
that he was awaiting payment from several trade debtors and that, once he had 
been remunerated, he would pay off the overdraft. The husband was simultaneously 
being pressed for payment by his own creditors and so appeared to be in no position 
to make good the situation. 
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2.36. Enter the questionable transaction. In due course the husband receives three 
cheques which could have bettered his financial situation. The cheques were not 
made out to his business but to the ‘account payee’. The husband paid these 
cheques into his own personal account held with the First National Bank of Chicago, 
not into his business account held with the applicant bank in this case, had he done 
so it would have cleared the overdraft. Following the disposition he withdrew the 
funds and closed his personal account. On balance it seems that he proceed to hand 
the money in cash to his wife who deposited it with two banks in Abu Dhabi and 
instructed them to transfer the funds by telegraph to a personal account held by her 
in London with the First National Bank of Chicago. This being done left the wife with 
some £70,000 in her London Bank. The applicants (the Abu Dhabi Chartered bank) on 
the other hand were left with an outstanding overdraft. To exacerbate matters the 
husband went missing. 
 
2.37. The applicant bank made enquires and traced transactions to London and 
established that a large sum was deposited to the credit of the wife there. The 
applicants sought an injunction to restrain the wife from disposing of or otherwise 
dealing with those funds until the matter could be resolved. Such an injunction was 
granted by Mocatta J but discharged upon the wife’s application by Donaldson J. 
Donaldson J held that the matter should properly be dealt with by the courts of Abu 
Dhabi and noted that orders of the English courts do not have an extraterritorial 
effect.75 Nonetheless as had been the repeated practice of Donaldson J in cases 
                                                     
75
 Ibid.  
54 
 
involving Mareva relief, the injunction was extended temporarily until the Court of 
Appeal could hear the case.  
 
2.38. If the discharge of the injunction had been immediately effective then that 
would have left the applicant bank in a precarious position. The wife had stated in 
her affidavit that she had several family members in countries ranging from Jordan to 
Beirut, in the absence of an injunction restraining her ability to do so she could with 
all right withdraw the funds in question and relocate them to another jurisdiction. 
The applicant bank would have had no other recourse than to attempt to serve the 
husband and sue in Abu Dhabi, obtain a judgment and place the husband in 
bankruptcy there, but as previously discussed such action as well as being fraught 
with technical difficulties is entirely pointless if (a) the husband cannot be found and/ 
or (b) the husband has no access to monies for recompense.76 On the face of it the 
husband had acted to wilfully evade the obligations he owed to his creditors.   
 
 
Resident or non-resident – when a defendant evades the court the same consequences 
affect innocent creditors    
 
2.39. In the Words of Joseph Beale: 
‘It is so palpably unjust that a debtor should be able, by 
putting his property outside of the jurisdiction of the courts of 
his own domicil, to escape the compulsion of courts forcing 
him to discharge his obligation, that the court within whose 
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jurisdiction his property has been thus placed by him should 
use its power over the property to give justice to the 
creditor’.77  
2.40. Such was Lord Denning MR’s rationale as on examination it was evident that 
the husband had tenaciously acted to avoid his duty to pay his creditors by removing 
his assets from his jurisdiction and on the evidence the wife acted as the agent or 
nominee of the husband and those moneys were in the view of Lord Denning MR ‘his 
moneys still or the firms moneys.’78  
 
2.41. Lord Denning MR dealt with the husband and wife separately. Counsel for the 
wife submitted that Lord Denning MR’s own comments in Rasu precluded extension 
of Mareva relief to touch upon an English resident:  
‘So far as concerns defendants who are within the jurisdiction 
of the court and have assets here, it is well-established that 
the court should not, in advance of any order or judgment, 
allow the creditor to seize any of the money or goods of the 
debtor or to use any legal process’.79  
2.42. However in making that statement Lord Denning MR was referring to judicial 
inclinations in relation to those permanently resident in the jurisdiction whose assets 
were also here. He distinguished that scenario from the present case in which Mrs 
Daklouche who had formerly declared to be a temporary resident only but later 
claimed to have the intention to reside here permanently. Regardless of domicile 
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where it is considered to be likely that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction Lord 
Denning held that Mareva relief was both admissible and just.80       
 
2.43. Daklouche is an important case for one silent reason; it marked further 
development in the field of Mareva relief, significantly affirming that even where a 
defendant is present or even a temporary resident in the jurisdiction and is served 
there Mareva relief may be granted.81 That is important because it had previously 
been postulated that if a party could be served in the jurisdiction then Mareva relief 
could not apply. However as Everleigh LJ pointed out, such a principle would create 
an absurd situation whereby a party expecting to be served would simply travel to 
the jurisdiction accept the proper service of the writ and extinguish the Mareva 
relief. It is therefore submitted that the extension of Mareva relief to encompass this 
scenario was a commendable and pragmatic move.82   
 
The consistency of the court’s approach to foreign-based defendants and 
English-defendants   
 
2.44. The extension of the Mareva jurisdiction to capture temporary residents was 
notionally approved obiter dicta in the Unimarine SA case.83 Although the capture of 
parties resident within the jurisdiction, temporary or otherwise was contested by 
Ormrod LJ and Brandon LJ in the Bank of Leumi case, who considered it to be settled 
law that where a person is resident you may not restrain them from dealing with 
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their assets.84 The Siskina85 is a significant case because it was the first time that the 
House of Lords considered the controversial Mareva jurisdiction. The House 
reviewed two main points: 
a) Did the RSC Ord 11 provide jurisdictional grounds upon which to legitimately 
service a non-resident defendant with the necessary writ?  
b) Did the courts actually have the authority to order a Mareva Injunction in the 
first place?  
2.45. The discussions in the House focused largely on the first point, that is 
whether or not the applicants could bring their claim under the then operative RSC 
ORD 11 r.1(1)(i). The Houses conclusion was that the applicants could not. 
Consequently the jurisdiction to adjudge the application on its merits or to confirm 
an interlocutory injunction therewith was nullified. The House of Lords did not 
deliberate upon the validity of the second point that is of the Mareva injunctive 
jurisdiction. However Lord Hailsham made noteworthy observations, the import 
being that the judicial distinction between resident and foreign defendants was 
untenable. Accordingly his Lordship indicated that in order for procedural propriety 
to prosper the position vis-à-vis applicants claiming against defendants who were 
resident within the English jurisdiction would have to be modified or the concept of 
the Mareva jurisdiction would have to be amended. Thus in a later case Sir Robert 
Megarry VC allowed a Mareva injunction over assets owned by an English defendant 
who was abroad temporarily but usually resided within the jurisdiction.86  
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2.46. In Rahman (Prince Abdul) bin Turki al Sudairy v Abu-Taha87 the extension of 
the Mareva jurisdiction received further fortification. The Court of Appeal allowed a 
Mareva injunction against two Kuwaiti defendants who by their own admission were 
permanent residents in England,88 the injunction operated in a manner and form 
which forbade the removal of the defendant’s assets from the jurisdiction and the 
dissipation of those assets within the jurisdiction. It is true that the original focus of 
the Mareva jurisdiction was foreign-based defendants because the courts considered 
the case for restraining assets as particularly persuasive where a defendant had 
limited ties to the jurisdiction.89 Nonetheless Devonshire identifies a patent reality; 
debtor intentions’ to thwart an eventual judgment reward is not a tendency that is 
peculiar to any one class of defendants.90 In practice a party who was resident within 
the jurisdictional reach of the court was just as capable and likely to evade their 
obligations to a creditor by placing their assets beyond the reach of the court as a 
purely foreign-defendant. Lord Denning MR referring to the comments of Lord 
Hailsham in the Siskina asserted that where Mareva relief is concerned all 
defendants should be regarded in the same way ‘no matter whether they be foreign-
based or English-based’.91 It is in that wider format that Vitale considers the Mareva 
injunction to be a most valuable weapon in the arsenal of the modern applicant.92   
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Legislative intervention: The Statutory mandate to grant relief     
    
2.47. Today in England the statutory authority to dispense Mareva injunctive relief 
is established by section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.93 There are three 
provisions of particular interest to this chapter’s discourse which are stated below 
and of them the third is most significant:  
Section 37 Powers of High Court with respect to injunctions and receivers. 
1. The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an 
injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the 
court to be just and convenient to do so. 
2. Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and 
conditions as the court thinks just. 
3.  The power of the High Court under subsection (1) to grant an 
interlocutory injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from 
removing from the jurisdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing 
with, assets located within that jurisdiction shall be exercisable in cases 
where that party is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled, 
resident or present within that jurisdiction.  
 
2.48. The thirty-seventh section of the Senior Court Act 1981 superseded section 
45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925.94 Section 45 of the 
SCJA 1925 as previously discussed,95 stated that:  
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‘The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) 
grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which 
it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so’. 
2.49. Discussions within this chapter have contained an extended analysis of the 
case law which laid the foundations of Mareva relief. That discussion demonstrated 
that Mareva relief was from the outset a contentious topic. It was identified that 
certain proponents of the practices of the Old Court of the Chancery believed that 
the emergent Mareva jurisdiction (which was reliant upon section 45 SCJA 1925) was 
contrary to the established and restrictive body of case-law which developed 
following the Judicature Acts 1873-1875. The restrictive proponent’s opinions aligned 
closely with the previously discussed sentiments of Mr Mustill Q.C in the Rasu case 
who put it to the Court that in truth there was no authentic jurisdiction which 
allowed a court to legitimately grant a Mareva injunction at all.96 Section 37 of the 
Senior Court Act 1981 is therefore of great significance because it is declaratory that 
the courts may dispense Mareva relief under a legitimate statutory authority. Today 
a set of Civil Practice Rules guide the practitioner, stipulating many procedural 
aspects of the modern Mareva jurisdiction. In the next chapter discussions will focus 
on how this area of the law is practicably effected. For now it is sufficient to 
comment that the legitimacy of the jurisdiction to grant Mareva relief is beyond any 
doubt.      
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What caused the legislative delay?  
 
2.50. Dishonesty is not a new concept; its existence is a pervasive reality which has 
been known to manifest itself in the actions of some human beings throughout 
history.97 It is also true that the intention of some debtors to avoid or evade making 
payment to their creditors by distributing or otherwise dealing with their assets in 
such a way as to thwart enforcement is not a new concept; it could be said that such 
conduct is an incident or manifestation of that same dishonesty which has persisted 
throughout time. The Fraudulent Conveyances Act 157198 drafted during the reign of 
Queen Elizabeth I was focussed upon defeating fraudulent transactions and schemes 
which were intended to spirit away assets in order to deprive creditors of the 
recompense to which they were honestly entitled. The purposive statue allowed a 
fraudulent transaction to be unwound following insolvency or bankruptcy, the Act 
encompassed a broad class of transactions or conduct which in the view of the court, 
‘have been and are devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion or guile, 
to the end, purpose and intent, to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors’.99    
 
2.51. The extract above is but a small section of the statute, the torrential style100 
in which the full statute was drafted was indicative of the various ways in which 
debtors attempted to avoid their obligations in the sixteenth century and at the 
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centre of that conduct was a failure on the part of the debtor to do justice to the 
obligation owed to his creditor and a declaration by the legislature that such 
behaviour is reprehensible and should be combated accordingly.101 Although it is 
noted that outside of England attempts to combat fraudulent conveyances are older 
still than even the Elizabethan statute.102 The old Elizabethan law on fraudulent 
conveyance required a high threshold of proof and enforcement was only attainable 
post judgment and only once insolvency or bankruptcy was established. So, while the 
spirit of the Elizabethan statute was admirable, in practice it was not always practical 
and it certainly would not capture the Mareva scenarios discussed in the first part of 
this Chapter. Citing the Elizabethan statute is valuable because it demonstrates the 
longstanding insidious nature of a dishonest debtor in the eyes of the law in England 
and raises a legitimate question; why did the old courts of the Chancery, founded 
upon principles of justice and fairness103 not conceive of Mareva relief long before 
1975? Their unwillingness to do so appears (at least with hindsight) to stand contrary 
to the equitable maxim ‘equity will suffer no wrong to be without a remedy’. Gee 
suggests that the answer lies within policy considerations and the established English 
customary principle of a man’s assets being his own.104 
 
2.52. To repeat certain notions touched upon throughout this chapter: a subsisting 
debt does not bestow any ability upon a creditor to exact any legal or equitable right 
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upon a man’s assets.105 Lord Hatherley LC believed that for the courts to conceive of 
such a right would be a ‘fearful authority’,106 which could be open to abuse. The 
policy consideration was accordingly fuelled by a desire to avoid the risk that a party 
to a proceeding commenced by a creditor could be placed under abject financial 
pressure. Prohibiting a defendant from dealing with his own assets day to day could 
be an unfair imposition, blocking his income or perhaps destroying his trade entirely. 
Blameless third parties, for example customers of the defendant could find that their 
subsisting agreements were breached as a result. Finally, the imposition of the 
equitable Mareva jurisdiction upon the assets of a debtor is notionally contrary to 
the rubric that a creditor should do everything within his power to extract security 
before extending credit or accept the potential consequences of knowingly and 




2.53. The body of case law that saw the initiation and development of the Mareva 
jurisdiction inferred that the view outlined immediately above was too simplistic. It 
failed to capture and address the numerous ways in which the court’s authority 
could be rendered impotent. Earlier in this chapter it was established that the range 
of options available to deceptive debtors to deal with their assets in such a way as to 
defeat an order of the court had become much more expansive, sophisticated and 
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difficult to unwind than when the Elizabethan draftsman put his legislative pen to 
paper.108 Logic dictates that if a post judgment convoluted forensic analysis of the 
trail of assets can be avoided then that is surely favourable. The early Mareva cases 
cautioned of the cogent reality that debtors could spirit away large amounts of funds 
by means of a telex or an electronic transfer to a jurisdiction beyond the remit of the 
English courts. Assets may be switched between offshore companies; they may be 
hidden in offshore trusts. The consequence was that injured creditors could be left 
with no other option than to secure a judgment from the court and then proceed to 
undertake a detective’s work; to reverse engineer what may have happened to the 
assets which were trite for recompense in-between a defendant’s being notified of a 
trial or action and the judgment thereof. More often than not as the early Mareva 
cases demonstrated assets may have been siphoned off or transferred through a 
series of foreign jurisdictions and entities ranging from personal bank accounts, to 
real property, trusts or companies; funds may even have been converted at the drop 
of a hat into precious metals or stones and conveyed about a smuggler’s person to 
lands foreign and inaccessible.  
 
2.54. The forensic process required to follow a deceptive trail once a final judgment 
has been given can be unduly burdensome upon the creditor who has already been 
failed by that party to which they extended credit in good faith and if that party 
avoided making payment to begin with then it stands to reason that they may also be 
willing to go out of their way to render a judgment futile. The corollary is thus to 
eliminate the possibility that a deceptive party can defeat the processes of the courts 
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by freezing their asset until a judgment award is made; today that remedy is 
available irrespective of where the defendant is domiciled so long as certain criteria 
are fulfilled. Having weighed up all of these considerations it was evident that some 
action should be taken in order to preserve the virtue of the justice system. On 
continental Europe such mechanisms were already in existence, while in the USA 
that policy determination was left squarely in the hands of the legislature.109 Here in 
England the judiciary initiated the process, steered by the hand of Lord Denning MR 
and the decisions taken by the courts presided over by him were later codified by the 
legislature. Henceforward the aforementioned restrictive sentiments of Mr Mustill 
Q.C in the Rasu case were consigned to the history books. Essentially, if there is a risk 
that a defendant may abscond or remove assets from the jurisdiction or otherwise 
dispose of them within the jurisdiction then Mareva relief is admissible irrespective 
of domicile, residence or nationality. In the following chapter the modern Mareva 
jurisdiction is discussed in relation to other analogous devices, relief and ancillary 
orders. It will become apparent that when employed in conjunction with other 
techniques or orders the Mareva injunction can be extraordinarily effective.                                        
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Chapter Three: The Modern Mareva Jurisdiction and the Mechanisms 




3.1. In Chapter Two the classical issues which precipitated the development of the 
Mareva injunction were discussed and it was observed that even in the 1970s 
deceptive tactics made it difficult for a claimant to achieve restitution. However, the 
typical scenarios giving rise to a Mareva application have changed since those 
fledgling cases. The emerging pan-global economy enables increasingly intricate 
commercial transactions to be established. The modern global economy offers 
organisations and individuals the opportunity to profit on the back of skilfully 
fashioned international deals. However these opportunities also present more 
occasions for contracts to be broken and for creditors to be misled by debtors.1  
Furthermore, claimants are faced with increasingly sophisticated technology which 
allows for the transfer of financial assets at the drop of a hat by parties operating 
with anonymity. This chapter surveys certain measures taken by the English courts to 
combat the adverse scenarios generated by processes of globalisation and 
developing technologies. It will become apparent that the English courts have crafted 
erudite judicial remedies which allow claimants to act both covertly and decisively in 
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order to protect interests in assets which may otherwise be spirited away.2 It shall be 
seen that such remedies consist of a matrix of pre-trial interlocutory orders which 
may be instituted in order to freeze an impugned asset, facilitate discovery or 
preserve evidence where it is likely that a defendant will defraud a creditor or 
otherwise organise their affairs in such a manner as to inequitably obstruct the 
resolution of disputed legal or factual issues.                  
 
Understanding the modern Mareva context  
 
3.2. One relatively simple technique employed by debtors or fraudsters is where 
funds are converted into cash which is then used to open one or more bank accounts 
under names which are not easily linked to the individual or company from which the 
funds originated. Another common and relatively simple method used by those 
seeking to cover their tracks is the withdrawal of funds from a bank account which 
are then transferred from one jurisdiction to another via a range of informal 
measures, for example via the ‘hawala’ system employed in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East.3 Alternatively, payments may be made by companies in jurisdictions 
where it is difficult to gain any information relating to movements between accounts 
or even about the companies who made the payments. One method popularised by 
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the media is where an elusive party utilises offshore bank accounts which bear no 
name; only an anonymous account number. These offshore accounts are often 
located in regions which are characterised by a disinclination on the part of the banks 
to cooperate with a party who seeks information about the account holder. 
However, it ought to be appreciated that such accounts and jurisdictions are not 
absolutely impenetrable; cooperation may be solicited but the degree of cooperation 
does vary from region to region and case to case.4   
 
3.3. There are a great number of other methods utilised in order to shroud the 
trail left by practices intended to conceal assets. It is not uncommon for a person 
who wishes to evade detection to create a complex labyrinth of transfers, 
withdrawals and proprietary conversions. Funds may be routed through several 
domestic and/ or international banks; a transfer may be made to a company, a family 
member or another person under the control or influence of the person who is 
making the transfer; a transfer may be made to a discretionary trust where the 
beneficiaries are members of the transferor’s family or where the trustees are 
controlled or influenced by the person making the transfer. A person may: borrow 
against their assets and then transfer or convert the borrowed funds by those means 
above; make payments into insurance policies; make repayments on mortgages held 
by another family member; use more traditional methods such as purchasing 
travellers’ cheques to encash in a different location; convert their funds via the 
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purchase of precious stones or jewellery which are then transported elsewhere; or 
use concealed safe-deposit boxes.5 This list is certainly not exhaustive but it serves to 
demonstrate that where a claimant seeks recompense extrication alone may be a 
formidable task. It also highlights that deceptive schemes often involve one or more 
foreign jurisdictions which may necessitate the supplication of the World Wide 
Mareva jurisdiction which will receive attention shortly. Clearly pursuing the trail of 
assets apposite for remuneration can be an extremely challenging task. The process 
directed at unravelling such complicated trails is broadly referred to as asset tracing 




3.4. Accounting for the introductory discussion above it is clear that where a 
claimant contacts a practitioner seeking advice in relation to an outstanding debt and 
indicates that there is a risk that a debtor may attempt to dispose of or dissipate 
assets which may be targeted in the future to satisfy that debt, preserving those 
assets is not necessarily a straightforward case of petitioning the court for a freezing 
injunction pending a final judgment order. Practitioners must take into consideration 
a number of varying factors: whether the debtor is worth suing in financial terms, or 
perhaps whether criminal proceedings are more appropriate; the current locale of 
the debtor; the debtor’s known connections both outside of the domestic jurisdiction 
and within it; the extent to which the debtor’s lifestyle may indicate where assets 
may have been hidden or dispersed; the extent and location of the debtor’s assets; 
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and who currently holds and or controls the impugned assets.6 It is submitted that an 
‘asset tracing’ exercise may be of great benefit to any practitioner attempting to 
untangle a debtor’s web.     
 
3.5. For the purposes of this discussion ‘asset tracing’ is to be broadly regarded as 
the process of tracing a monetary value in the manner and form established by Lord 
Millett in Foskett v Mckeown.7 Tracing is thus the exercise by which the claimant 
demonstrates what has happened to their property, identifying the proceeds and the 
parties who have handled, or received it. The exercise justifies the applicant’s claim, 
establishing that the proceeds may be properly regarded as representing their 
property. Tracing is different from claiming. It ascertains the ‘traceable’ proceeds of a 
claimant’s property enabling that claimant to substitute the traceable proceeds for 
the asset which originally formed the subject matter of their claim. The principles of 
law which govern the exercise of tracing are themselves complex and must be 
carefully regarded by the practitioner.8 Nevertheless, there are a range of ancillary 
orders and procedures which assist in effecting the Mareva jurisdiction. It shall be 
seen that some are suitable for use prior to the claimant’s application for an ex parte 
freezing injunction on a preparatory basis and some others are only granted by the 
court as an ancillary or interlocutory order. Regardless, each order which follows 
(including the freezing injunction itself)9 may be considered an order of the court 
generally available for civil asset tracing.  
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3.6. Legal practitioners are duty bound to ensure that their clients are informed 
from the outset that where any litigation undertaking is concerned there may be a 
substantial cost involved.10 Where the Mareva jurisdiction is concerned it is 
submitted that in the long run it may be wise for a claimant to commit resources 
prior to a Mareva application on a preparatory basis and/ or for a practitioner to 
advise them in this respect. Of the orders which follow the Norwich Pharmacal and 
Bankers Trust jurisdictions are commended as suitable preparatory mechanisms and 
as it shall be observed where a covert operation is required either order may be 
joined with a Gagging and/ or Sealing Order.11  Such pre-trial preparatory exercises 
bring two distinct advantages.  Firstly, the exercise could reduce the possibility that 
unforeseen costs will arise and perhaps give an indication as to whether or not a 
lengthy litigation process is worth pursuing at all; where it is unlikely that suitable 
assets will ever be located the process may well become a futile and costly exercise. 
The potential scale of a Mareva case must not be underestimated. By way of 
example the JSC BTA Bank cases12 have been an ongoing dispute with actions in 
numerous courts. Since the claimant first sought advice the costs have spiralled and 
there have been in the region of fifty interim applications including but not limited to 
applications for disclosure, cross-examination, appointment of a receiver, Norwich 
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 CPR SI 1998/3132; Jonathan Herring, Legal Ethics (OUP 2014) 267-271. 
11
 See Ch 2 para 2.23.1. 
12
 Ablyazov & ors v JSC BTA Bank [2011] EWCA Civ 1588; JSC BTA Bank v A & ors [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1125; JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov  [2010] EWHC 1779 (Comm); JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & ors 
[2011] EWHC 1136 (Comm); JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & ors [2011] EWHC 2500 (Comm); JSC BTA v 
Ablyazov & ors [2011] EWHC 2664 (Comm); JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & ors [2012] EWHC 455 
(Comm); JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & ors [2012] EWHC 783 (Comm); JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & ors 
[2012] All ER (D) 85; JSC BTA v Ablyazov [2012] EWHC 648; JSC BTA Bank v Kythreotis & ors [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1436; JSC BTA Bank v Mukhtar A & ors [2010] EWHC 90 (Comm); JSC BTA Bank v 
Mukhtar Ablyazov & ors [2011] EWHC 202 (Comm); JSC BTA Bank v Mukhtar Ablyazov [2012] 
EWCA Civ 639; JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320 Fourie v Le Roux 
[2007] 1 WLR 320 Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320 & ors [2010] EWHC 2843 (Ch); JSC BTA Bank 
v Solodchenko & ors [2011] EWHC 2163 (Ch); JSC BTA Bank v Shalabayev & anor [2011] EWHC 2915 
(Ch).   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Pharmacal orders and proceedings for contempt. Clearly claimants and practitioners 
must be mindful of the potential magnitude of a Mareva case; it is submitted that a 
preparatory exercise which utilises the techniques, procedures and court orders 
discussed within this chapter can assist in this respect.  
 
3.7. Secondly, it is cogently inadvisable that a claimant should depend upon a 
party who has already reneged upon their obligation to repay a debt to conduct 
themselves transparently during proceedings. A claimant to a freezing injunction can 
only rely on that order to be truly effective where the respondent to it complies fully 
with its terms and any ancillary components (such as standard disclosure).13 For that 
reason the use of well-timed pre-trial or interlocutory asset tracing exercises which 
utilises one or more of the mechanisms below may be valuable because it seeks to 
identify at the earliest stage possible, the range of assets which may become 
amenable in order to satisfy a judgment order in the future. It is repeated that 
Identifying the assets before a freezing injunction is granted can bring great benefits, 
not least having that order composed so that it captures specific assets from the 
outset rather than risking a dispute arising at a later stage as to whether or not a 
standard form order will capture a certain class of asset or touch a certain asset 





                                                     
13 See para 3.19.2.  
14
 See Ch 4 para 4.17. 
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The modern Freezing injunction 
 
3.8 Before the turn of the millennium in April of 1999 the introduction of the Civil 
Procedure Rules (CPR), brought with them a change in terminology for the Mareva 
jurisdiction. The Mareva injunction is now termed as a ‘freezing order’ pursuant to 
CPR r25 1(1) (f). There is a plain logic for this being so, as it is an ‘injunction’ which 
effectively freezes assets. In accordance with the provision a ‘freezing injunction is 
regarded as an order: 
(i) Restraining a party from removing from the jurisdiction assets located 
there: or  
(ii) Restraining a party from dealing with any assets whether located within 
the jurisdiction or not. 
The new terminology was intended to be representative of the nature of Mareva 
relief.  It had the effect of simplifying the language which related to the jurisdiction; 
employing analogous conceptual terminology to that already in use in various 
jurisdictions across the globe. The introduction of the plain language approach with 
its usage of terminology like ‘freezing order’ or freezing injunction’ could have the 
effect of shrouding the nature and development of the Mareva jurisdiction. In 2004 
Lord Millett vocalised a similar observation in relation to CPR Pt 72. His Lordship 
feared that the introduction of new terminology could mask the proprietary nature 
of performance by third party debt orders which is peculiar to the historical 
development of what was formerly termed a Garnishee Order. His Lordship criticised 
the discontinuation of the term ‘Garnishee Order’ because its previous usage 
74 
 
brought with it a more comprehensive understanding of that jurisdiction.15 It pointed 
to a more comprehensive or fuller appreciation of the Garnishee Order in terms of its 
heritage and development; explicating not only what the law was but importantly 
why it was so. It is submitted that the same is true here; the true nature of Mareva 
relief inclusive of its unique development in the courts of equity must not be 
obscured or overlooked through the desire to simplify the language of the law. 
Therein lies the utility of the two previous chapters, they stand to illuminate the 
heritage of the Mareva jurisdiction, to explain its peculiar development in order to 
provide a more complete picture which fortifies the rational integrity of the law in 
relation to the modern freezing injunction.    
 




3.9.  It was argued at the close of the previous chapter that it is now beyond 
doubt that the courts in England will award a freezing injunction over the assets of a 
defendant pursuant to section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 where it is “just 
and convenient”.16 That submission was recently reaffirmed within the Eco Quest plc 
v GFI Consultants decision.17 It is reemphasised here because it is considered to be an 
expression which captures the essence of the Mareva jurisdiction. The court’s 
jurisdiction to grant a freezing injunction is unrestricted save by the court’s own 
assessment of what the appropriate course is based on a full assessment of the 
                                                     
15
 Compare Societe Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Compagnie Internationale de Navigation [2004] 1 AC 260 
[112].        
16
 See Ch 2 para 2.29. 
17
 [2014] EWHC 4329 (QB) [83] (Salter J).  
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distinct scenario set before it;18 an assessment which may be influenced by equitable 
defences such as hardship or unclean hands.19 What shall become apparent as this 
thesis progresses is that the courts will do what is just and convenient but also 
necessary to make the Mareva jurisdiction an effective one.     
 
3.10. A freezing order composed in the standard form20 is intended to capture all of 
the defendant’s assets whether those assets are held in the defendant’s name 
personally or whether they are solely or jointly owned. The order is intended to 
operate upon any asset irrespective of whether a defendant can directly or indirectly 
dispose of or deal with that asset as if it were his personally. Furthermore the 
defendant is considered to possess such a power even if a third party controls or 
holds that asset in accord with the defendant’s direct or indirect instructions. 
Although in Chapter Four it will become apparent that in practice the issue of 




3.11. There are four main criteria which must be satisfied in order for an 
application to be successful. In practice it is established that the courts will grant an 
order to support proceedings in England where:  
                                                     
18
 E.g. while the court would commonly discharge a freezing injunction following the making of an 
administration order, a winding up order or a bankruptcy order (thereby allowing the defendants assets 
to be applied in accordance with the statutory scheme), in the exercise of its discretion the court may 
alternatively consider there to be scenarios where it is “just and convenient” to allow it to continue e.g. 
see, Eco Quest plc v GFI Consultants [2014] EWHC 4329 (QB) [82]-[86] (Salter J).  
19
 ICF Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and 
Equitable Damages (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 2014) 540; CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Lambert 
[1983] Ch 37; see also, JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (No 8) [2013] 1 WLR 1331.  
20
 Note, the ‘standard form freezing order’ is annexed to CPR PD 25A. 
21
 See Ch 4 para 4.5.  
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1. There is a clear course of justifiable action in England.  
2. The applicant can establish that on the merits there is a good arguable case.22  
3. The applicant is able to evidence the prima facie existence of assets that are 
within the jurisdiction23 or outside of it in the case of a Worldwide Freezing 
Order.24  
4. The applicant can demonstrate that there is a genuine risk that the defendant 
may attempt to dissipate or dispose of the impugned assets without good 
cause before such time as a judgment could be given or enforced, thereby 
rendering any eventual judgment impotent.25  
 
Important considerations for applicants 
 
3.12. There are a number of important issues which an applicant should consider 
when supplicating the Mareva jurisdiction: 
1. A Mareva injunction does not give the applicant with any form of security 
over the relevant assets. Neither does a Mareva injunction provide the 
applicant with priority above the respondent’s other creditors in the case that 
the respondent becomes insolvent.26   
2. All applicants have a duty to provide the court with evidence of all material 
facts which may be relevant to the case upon which the applicant relies.27 
                                                     
22
 Robert Pearce, John Stevens and Warren Barr, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th edn, 
OUP 2010) 150; Re BCCISA (No 9) [1994] 3 All ER 764 [785]. 
23
 Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs v Cozens [2011] EWHC 2782 (Ch) [72]. 
24
 See para 3.15.  
25
 Irish Response Ltd v Direct Beauty Products Ltd [2011] EWHC 37 (QB) [25]-[41] (Seymour J). 
26
 Cretanor Maritime Co Ltd v Irish Marine Management Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 164; Flightline Ltd v 
Edwards and anor [2002] EWHC 1648 (Ch), [2003] EWCA Civ 63.  
27
 CPR 25A r3.3; Third Chandris Shipping Corpn v Unimarine SA [1979] QB 645; see also, Negocios Del 
Mar SA v Doric Shipping Corpn SA, The Assios [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331; Brinks-MAT Ltd v Elcombe 
[1988] 3 All ER 188; Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1990] 3 All ER 303.  
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3. Applicants will be generally required to provide undertakings to the court; 
this will typically include a cross-undertaking in damages.28 
4. Mareva injunctions are not enforceable in foreign jurisdictions without the 
permission of the English courts. The injunction will not have a binding 
extraterritorial effect upon third parties until and unless it has been 
recognised, registered and enforced in the relevant court of foreign 
jurisdiction.29 
5. Delay may defeat a claim in accordance with the usual rules in relation to 
equitable remedies. In addition to the fact that delay may undermine an 
application it may also increase the risk that the respondent may dissipate 
their assets prior to an order.30    
 
Important considerations for respondents  
 
3.13. There are a number of important points which a respondent to a freezing 
order should consider: 
1. A respondent will normally be required by the court within a specific 
timeframe to provide disclosure of all of their assets.31  
2. A respondent should carefully and promptly consider whether or not there 
may be any legitimate grounds to apply to the courts to have the order varied 
or discharged.32 
                                                     
28
 CPR 25A r5.1(1); Third Chandris ibid. 
29
 See para 3.21. 
30
 Spry (n 19) 546; Fisher v Brooker [2009] 1 WLR 1764. 
31
 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon [1990] Ch 48.  
32
 The standard form order, annexed to CPR 25A, para 2 and 13. 
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3. A respondent to an order should take all necessary steps to make sure that 
they comply with the terms of a freezing order. A respondent who breaches 
an order will be committed for contempt which may result in the seizure of 
assets, a fine and/ or imprisonment.33 
 
The procedure  
 
3.14. Freezing orders are ordinarily supplicated ex parte (without notice to the 
respondent). Providing the defendant with notice may defeat the objects of the 
order. The general application procedure is outlined in CPR Part 23 and CPR PD 23A. 
The application will generally be made to a judge from the High Court or a circuit 
judge in the County Court. There are other notable procedural aspects:  
1. The application notice is completed by way of ‘Form N244’ or ‘N244 (CC)’ in 
the Commercial Court. 
2. A draft order will normally be based upon the standard form order which is 
annexed to CPR PD 25A or Appendix 5 of the Guide to the Commercial Court.  
3. Supporting evidence for the application is made by way of affidavit as per CPR 
PD 25A r3.1. 
4. Generally the respondent is required either immediately or within a specified 
timeframe (upon receipt of the order) to inform the applicant’s solicitors of 
the value and location all of their assets.34  
5. Where a Mareva injunction is or ordered ex parte it normally be granted for a 
specified period of time. Furthermore a return date will be stipulated for a full 
                                                     
33
 Ibid, para 16; Contempt of Court Act 1981.  
34
 See, CPR 25A r9(1). 
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hearing during which the court will decide whether the order should be 
continued, varied or discharged.35 
 
Foreign Assets and Proceedings 
 
3.15. When an English court is presented with a case that falls purely within the 
borders of its own jurisdiction that court may act with a level of confidence that its 
judgments will be complied with and its orders enforced. Originally in England the 
Mareva injunction was confined to operate domestically; although that same rule 
was not conventional in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.36 The restrictive position 
of the English courts altered following a number of decisions in the last two years of 
the nineteen-eighties. Now Worldwide Freezing Orders (WFO) and other associated 
orders can be granted by the courts in relation to assets located abroad as well as 
domestically.37 Although where an asset or a defendant is located outside of the 
English jurisdiction the court is faced with additional jurisdictional issues which must 
be taken into account.38 It is noted that the jurisdiction to grant extraterritorial 
Mareva orders is ardently opposed by some who claim that the English courts should 
not presume to grant a WFO unless that court has personal jurisdiction over the 
party against whom the order is made.39 Nonetheless, in practice the WFO has been 
                                                     
35
 CPR 25A r5.1(3).   
36
 See, Ballabil Holdings Pty Ltd v Hospital Products Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 155; Coombs & Barei 
Construction Pty Ltd v Dynasty Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 413; Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co 
of North America (1987) 7 NSWLR 571; National Australia Bank v Dessau [1988] VR 521.  
37
 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 & 4) [1990] Ch 65; National Australia Bank Ltd v Dessau [1988] 
VR 521; Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320; on the subject of guidelines as to the form of an order 
form see, Practice Direction [1996] 1 WLR 1552.   
38
 For the most recent comprehensive domestic discussion see, Masri v Consolidated Contractors 
International Ltd (No 2) [2009] 2 WLR 621 [30]-[35] (Collins LJ).   
39
 For a deconstruction of the legitimacy of the extraterritorial jurisdiction to grant World Wide Mareva 
relief see, Trevor C Hartley, ‘Jurisdiction in Conflict of Laws - Disclosure, Third-Party Debt and 
Freezing Orders’ [2010] LQR 194, 194-221.  
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granted irrespective of whether a defendant had any assets inside of the 
jurisdiction,40 and/ or regardless of whether the applicant had yet to receive a 
judgment.41 There are a number of principles which play a significant role in the 
court’s assessment of whether a Mareva injunction should be extended to capture 
foreign assets;42 while an extensive analysis of them here would detract from the 
current discussion there are a number of comments which are worth making.   
 
3.16. There is a general inclination to limit the use of the Mareva jurisdiction to 
domestic applications or at least in relation to assets that fall within the remit of the 
English jurisdiction and there are sound reasons why that should be so. The most 
convincing argument thereof centres on comity considerations;43 the idea that the 
English courts should act with courtesy towards and consideration of another 
jurisdiction’s territorial sovereignty. Thus it has been asserted that the English courts 
should only consider the extension of a freezing injunction to capture foreign assets 
where there is considered to be a substantial risk that confining an order to our own 
jurisdiction would preclude the applicant’s effective protection.44 In Derby & Co Ltd v 
Weldon (No 1)45 Parker LJ declared that in the scenario that a court can determine 
that there are sufficient domestic assets which would cover the appropriate sum or 
where a court is not satisfied that foreign assets could be located or effectively 
                                                     
40
 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 & 4) [1990] Ch 65; Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320; National 
Australia Bank Ltd v Dessau [1988] VR 521; See Practice Direction [1996] 1 WLR 1552 Re the form 
of an order.   
41
 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (no 1) [1990] Ch 48; Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320. 
42
 Spry identifies seven core principles which govern the World Wide Freezing Orders availability, for 
a description see, Spry (n 19) 552. 
43
 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Ltd (No 2) [2009] 2 WLR 621 [35] (Collins LJ).  
44
 Spry (n 19) 552.  
45
 [1990] Ch 48.  
81 
 
frozen or where the extension of an order abroad would in all circumstances be 
oppressive, then to grant that order would be unjustified.46   
 
3.17. The comity consideration can also operate so as to assist a party located in 
another jurisdiction. So while the English courts are careful not to offend the 
sovereignty of another jurisdiction there are statutory provisions to assist foreign 
jurisdictions too. Section 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 enables 
the English courts to agree to a freezing injunction to assist foreign proceedings even 
where no proceedings have been commenced here. Refco v Eastern Trading Co47 
provides a two stage test which is to be adopted where section 25 is invoked. The 
first step is relatively simple, the court will consider how it would respond if the same 
case were laid before it domestically; would the court grant the relief in aid of 
domestic proceedings here? Secondly, the court will consider whether or not the lack 
of substantive jurisdiction would mean that the granting of relief were injudicious.48  
 
3.18. Much of the rationale driving the court’s willingness to allow orders which 
touch foreign assets or orders which assist foreign proceedings appear to be 
influenced by notions of jurisdictional cooperation and mutuality;49 parallel 
considerations expedited Article 81(1) on the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union: 
                                                     
46
 Ibid [56]. 
47
 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 159. 
48
 This second limb can be an extremely complicated issue, generally see, Credit Suisse Fides Trust Sa 
v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818; Felicity Toube, Jonathan Wheeler and Kevin Roberts, ‘England and Wales’ 
in Felicity Toube (ed), International Asset Tracing in Insolvency (OUP 2009) 46.  
49
E Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncoverred (OUP 2008); Nicolas 
Kyriakides, ‘A European-Wide Preservation Order: How the Common Law Practices Can Contribute’ 
(2014) 33(1) CJQ 93; 93-106. 
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“The Union Shall develop judicial cooperation in civil 
matters having cross-border implication, based on the 
principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of 
decisions in extrajudicial cases.”  
 
3.19. A very brief comment should be made in relation to the UK Parliament’s 
decision to opt out of the European Account Preservation Order Regulation (EU 
655/2014) (EAPO Regulation). The EAPO is a progressive procedural device which 
seeks to incorporate desirable aspects of associated orders from around the EU: the 
in rem attachment order and the in personam freezing order. The EAPO can be 
considered to be a product of the spirt of the abovementioned 81(1) TFEU which 
seeks to instil jurisdictional cooperation and mutuality across the Union. It could be 
construed that England’s decision to opt out of the EAPO appears to be contrary to 
the principles of jurisdictional cooperation. However it is submitted that its domestic 
adoption was largely unnecessary as Part 74 of the current Civil Procedure Rules 
1998/3132 are sufficiently fit for purpose. Kyriakides suggests that the EAPO will 
have the effect that other continental jurisdictions will better conform in practice to 
the concept of inter jurisdictional cooperation which is already active within both the 
English institution and other member states.50           
 
3.20. Throughout the last chapter it was noted that the Mareva cases often 
included inter-jurisdictional transactions. In order for the courts to be able to 
judiciously and consistently dispenses justice which touches assets beyond domestic 
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 Nicolas Kyriakides, ‘A European-Wide Preservation Order: How the Common Law Practices Can 
Contribute’ (2014) 33(1) CJQ 93; 93, 106. 
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borders the courts continue to be careful not to offend the judicial sovereignty of 
another jurisdiction and they must also be willing to assist another jurisdiction in 
order to propagate the transnational cultures of inter-jurisdictional cooperation and 
collaboration necessary to combat the modern elusive debtor.51  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the English Mareva jurisdiction is a generally progressive one, a 
fact that persists in relation to WFO’s too. The considerations which govern the 
availability of the WFO are modified and amended as the courts encounter new 
scenarios. As a result new guidelines (such as those discussed below) occasionally 
develop in order to preserve and further the spirit of justice which drives the 
equitable Mareva jurisdiction.  
 
3.21. Two significant provisos are now included in a WFO and both to one degree 
or another where created because of comity considerations and notions of judicial 
pragmatism. Following the Babanaft International case52 a freezing injunction which 
extends to touch foreign assets must contain a Babanaft proviso, which offers 
protection to foreign third parties by declaring that the injunction will not bite upon 
them until and unless that injunction has been acknowledged, registered or applied 
by the relevant court within that jurisdiction. Following Baltic Shipping v Translink 
Shipping Ltd53 a freezing order extending to capture foreign assets will also contain a 
Baltic proviso. It ensures that where a bank has a branch within the domestic 
jurisdiction, they are required to comply only with what they realistically consider 
their legal obligations to be in relation to assets which belong to a defendant which 
                                                     
51
 Lord Woolf, ‘The Tides of Change’ in RS Markesinis (ed), The British Contribution to the Europe of 
the Twenty-First Century (Hart 2002) 1, 10.  
52
 Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] Ch 13. 
53
 [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 673.  
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the bank holds at another branch abroad. This is an important proviso because 
where a bank assists in the breach of a freezing injunction or directly breaches that 
injunction it may be held in contempt of court.54      
 
Disclosure Orders  
 
3.19.1. There are two principal techniques utilised by the courts in order to ensure 
that the Mareva jurisdiction is effective. One principal method which commonly 
renders a freezing injunction effective is where a third party, normally a bank which 
the defendant holds an account with is committed for contempt if it knowingly 
assists in the breach of an order. Once the bank is placed on notice, contempt can be 
established irrespective of whether or not the defendant has been served with the 
order as the third party would be regarded as guilty of behaviour which knowingly 
interferes with the administration of justice by facilitating contravention of the 
order.55 The other principal technique involves disclosure. Disclosure is 
predominantly directed toward facilitating the delivery up of information and 
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 Note, that in certain circumstances a bank may become the subject of a dishonest assistance action. 
55
 Z Ltd v A-Z [1982] QB 558 (CA) [578] (Eveleigh LJ), approved in Att-Gen v Times Newspapers Ltd 
[1992] 1 AC 191; Lawrence Collins, Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (OUP 
1994) 87. 
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 See E.g. A v C [1981] QB 956; Bekhor & Co Ltd v Bilton [1981] QB 923 (CA); House of Spring 
Gardens Ltd v Waite [1958] FSR 173 (CA); Bank of Crete SA v Koskotas [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 587 





3.19.2. Within the English jurisdiction those party to a freezing order are required to 
provide disclosure of documents. Unless the contrary is stipulated by the courts then 
this means ‘standard disclosure’. The courts may limit disclosure or dispense with it 
entirely; those who are party to an order may agree to do the same. Standard 
disclosure will vary from case to case on the basis of: the documents that a party 
relies on, documents which are considered to adversely affect a party’s case 
personally, adversely affect the case of another party or support the case of another 
party and finally those documents that the court requires a party to disclose in 
accordance with a relevant practice direction.  A party required to provide disclosure 
must make reasonable searches for documentation. A party is authorised to inspect 
documentation revealed by way of a statement of claim, a witness summary or 
statement or a signed affidavit. The jurisdiction exists to order disclosure even where 
doing so would constitute a criminal offence in foreign law.57 The disclosure duty will 
continue until proceedings conclude. On application the courts are authorised to 
request a disclosure of specific documentation. The justification for the exercise of 
this discretion is the prevailing obligation of a party to provide access to 
documentation which will assist the other party’s case. The use of documentation 
disclosed to a party is not unlimited, disclosed documentation may only be used for a 
purpose which assists the proceedings for which the document was originally 
disclosed.58 Exceptions being where the court gives permission or where a document 
is read at a hearing which is held in public (although as shall be discussed shortly the 
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 Morris v Banque Arabe et Internationale d’Investissement [2000] CP Rep 65 Ch D; however the 
courts retain the discretion refuse to make it on comity grounds [73] (Neuberger J).     
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 Toube (n 48) 49.  
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courts may by way of order restrict such disclosure)59  or where both parties agree to 
the document’s use for some other purpose.  
 
 Pre-action Disclosure 
 
3.19.3. A party may seek disclosure prior to proceedings by way of a pre-action 
disclosure application. Domestically pre-action disclosure is obtained under CPR r31. 
16, it will be granted where the court can ascertain a likelihood that the claimant and 
respondent will become party to proceedings in the future. The court will also 
establish that the disclosure would be likely to fall within the range of standard 
disclosure (discussed above). The courts will consider the pre-action disclosure to be 
a desirable process to assist in the fair disposal of proceedings and/ or to assist in the 
resolution of those proceedings or to reduce costs. It should be noted that where 
pre-action disclosure is sought a potential claimant may alternatively consider 
utilising the Norwich Pharmacal or Bankers Trust jurisdiction, the two prospective 
jurisdictions to be discussed in due course, the former in particular is considered to 
be particularly useful where a claimant wishes to build a solid case covertly before an 




3.19.4. Where oral evidence and or the production and presentation of documents is 
requisite for the efficacy of a trial the court may summons a named individual under 
CPR r34.2. The production of documentation will ordinarily occur at a convenient 
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 See para 3.23.1. 
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date prior to the trial taking into account the time that parties may require to 
consider and review the material before the trial commences. Gross J declared in 
South Tyneside MBC v Wicks Building Supplies Ltd60 that witness summons are not 
appropriate devices for a speculative investigation, a summons must stipulate those 
documents which are sought. Delivery up of the documentation must be necessary 
either to resolve the matter or to save costs. The courts will pay close attention to 
and scrutinise any application which requests the production of confidential 
documents. The person summoned has the right to know what his or her obligations 
are under that summons and so it is particularly important that required documents 
are identified as part of a class of documents or are specifically identified.      
 
Other Ancillary Orders  
 
The Norwich Pharmacal Order 
 
3.20.1. The Norwich Pharmacal Order (NPO) can be extremely effective when used in 
conjunction with a freezing injunction.61 The device was borne out of Lord Reid’s 
judgment in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners.62 The NPO 
requires a third party who has unknowingly or innocently facilitated the wrongful act 
of another to assist the party that has been wronged. That assistance comes in the 
form of full and frank disclosure to the injured party about any and/ or all 
information ranging from a trail of transactions to the identity and or location of the 
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wrongdoer or those who have also been involved in the facilitation thereof.63 When 
being employed on a preparatory basis an NPO ought to be sought at an early stage 
before court proceedings have commenced; as identified it is manifestly 
advantageous that discovery of relevant information is obtained from banks, 
financial advisors and accountants promptly.  
 
3.20.2. A substantial volume of case law established that the following 
considerations may give rise to a court’s willingness to grant such relief.64 Generally, 
a respondent to a NPO will have been caught up in some manner or form of 
transgression and that involvement will have been more than merely bearing witness 
to the wrongdoing. An applicant will require of the respondent, documentation and/ 
or information intended to vindicate a right and/ or allow the claimant to protect him 
or herself following a conceived transgression or actual transgression. Although it is 
not a mandatory aspect of the jurisdiction that the required documents/ information 
are a definite precursor to court proceedings, this is commonly the case.   
 
3.20.3. A transgression or a feared transgression which gives rise to an NPO is not 
confined to claims of an equitable proprietary nature, but may include claims in tort; 
in equity, a breach of contract, a breach of confidence and also crime. The 
documentation/ information which is sought after is not confined to the identity of 
the transgressor; it may also encompass an enquiry to establish whether or not the 
perceived transgression actually occurred at all. As such, obtaining an NPO is a 
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pragmatic step because it could drastically reduce the exposure to the claimant in 
terms of monetary risks in the event that a claim has weak foundations and of 
spiralling legal costs or associated costs in forensic accountancy once a freezing 
injunction is served. An NPO is not a suitable device for the procurement of 
information or discovery in relation to a respondent who is placed beyond the 
domestic jurisdiction. In the scenario that a claimant requires information from a 
non-domestic party he or she should consider the preparation of letters rogatory. 
However a provision of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 198265 joined with 
principles established following Credit Suisse v Cuoghi66 allows a claimant to petition 
the English courts for an NPO to operate over a respondent who is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the English courts relation to proceedings which are taking place 
abroad.  
 
3.20.4. The NPO has received plentiful attention in recent time in relation to 
defamation suits, especially where the internet is involved; in eliminating the shelter 
conferred by the cyber anonymity of a person who is ‘trolling’67 its effectiveness is 
undisputed.68 However, its utility must not be overlooked where a claimant is 
considering issuing proceedings in the commercial court. It could be advanced that 
an NPO is only a necessary device where the procedures available under the CPR 
have been ruled out as appropriate. There is no doubt that caution should be 
                                                     
65
 s. 25(1) (5) Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as amended).  
66
 [1998] QB 818. 
67
 Trolling is the act of making a deliberately offensive or provocative online post with the aim of 
upsetting someone or eliciting an angry response, see, The Committee Office and House of Lords, 
‘House of Lords - Communications Committee - First Report’ (22 July 2014) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldcomuni/37/3704.htm> accessed 3 
September 2015.   
68
 Anna Vamialis, ‘Online Defamation: Confronting Anonymity’ (2013) 21 (3) International Journal of 
Law and IT 31, 45.  
90 
 
exercised when considering the use of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that attaching such a condition precedent to its 
invocation is entirely unwarranted; the NPO is not considered to be an exceptional 
remedy subject to stringent restrictions.69 The NPO remains a valuable preliminary 
device in the arsenal of the practitioner.70   
 
Nostro Accounts     
           
3.21.1. Where an asset transfer includes any US currency amount there is likely to 
have been a transfer between what are referred to as ‘Nostro’ accounts held in New 
York. A ‘Nostro’ account is an account which is held by a bank within a foreign 
jurisdiction which is usually that where the foreign currency originates. Taking as an 
example a person who has converted funds formerly GB sterling to US dollars thereof 
held in a New York Nostro account - the practitioner conducting the case for the 
claimant would be wise to consider obtaining an appropriate order in a New York 
Court.  
 
The Bankers Trust jurisdiction 
 
3.22.1. Where a claimant is merely concerned with gaining information which relates 
to the location of assets held by a banking organisation forming the subject matter of 
a proprietary claim, that claimant should consider invoking the Bankers Trust 
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jurisdiction. The Bankers Trust jurisdiction arose out of Bankers Trust Co v Shapira71 it 
is a device which bears a similarity to the NPO. However its ambit is significantly 
limited in scope. Bankers Trust applications are ordinarily sought against the third 
party bank who has become involved in laundering monies following a fraud. The 
third parties involvement in that laundering process places them in a position to 
disclose documentation/ information which may assist in the tracing process. The 
condition precedent for its supplication is that a claimant can demonstrate the 
genuine prospect that the provision of the information could help to preserve assets 
which form the basis of their proprietary claim. Where more information is required 
other than confirmation of location, a claimant may alternatively tender an 
application under statutory jurisdiction via the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879, 
though its remit is also limited. It does not include correspondence between a bank 
and a suspected fraudster, or information relating to paying in slips or cheques.72  
The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction is certainly the more suitable option where a 
more comprehensive picture is sought.         
 
‘Gagging Orders’  
 
3.23.1. The courts have the ability to issue an injunction which restrains the party it is 
served to from informing or otherwise indicating to third parties that proceedings 
have commenced or that any order has been made. A gagging order may be ordered 
in conjunction with a ‘sealing order’ which is effectively a judicially enforced secrecy 
order, it is binding upon the party to whom it is served and it also excludes the 
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general public from the normal access allowed to the record of the court’s 
proceedings.73 Secrecy orders are a good means of providing the claimant which 
sufficient time to consider and utilise the information gained by means of another 
order such as an NPO. Where an NPO and gagging order are combined they can 
provide the claimant party with the opportunity to gain information by means of a 
court order without a danger being posed to a cooperating third party of violation of 
their confidentiality duties owed to the primary party suspected of transgression. 
Gagging and sealing orders may also be issued ancillary to the operation of a freezing 
order.74 Working a covert asset tracing exercise from the outset can be particularly 
useful because the debtor or asset holder remains unaware that he or she is the 
subject of an investigation until such time as the trail has been extricated and the ex 




3.24.1. Search orders (originally Anton Piller orders)76 established at roughly the 
same time as the Mareva injunction and refer to an ex parte device which authorises 
a claimant, in conjunction with a supervising solicitor to gain entry to the 
respondent’s premises with the objective of inspecting them and removing 
documentation or other articles or soliciting information, for example by way of the 
examination of computer systems. A search order may incorporate other provisions 
or directions such as a clause which requires a defendant to respond honestly to one 
                                                     
73
 Martin S Kenney, ‘The Use of Sealing and Gagging Relief in Complex Insolvency Proceedings 
Involving the Investigation of Fraud and Discovery of Hidden Assets’ (2008) 2(1) Insolvency and 
Restructuring International 9. 
74
 Eric S Rein, ‘International Fraud: Freeze, Seize, And Retrieve’ (1999) 116 Banking L J 144. 
75
 Sim (n 3). 
76
 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55. 
93 
 
or more specified interrogatories or to tender full discovery in other specified 
respects.77 In practise the form of a search order may vary from one jurisdiction to 
the next and so the following discussion refers generally to the English jurisdiction. It 
is noted that when a domestic court has jurisdiction over a respondent its remit is 
extended to grant the order in respect of premises abroad. However such extension 
of the search order is less preferable than seeking an order in the courts of the 
applicable foreign country.78  
 
3.24.2. Anton Piller relief takes its namesake from Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing 
Processes Ltd.79 An application for a search order is made ex parte and accordingly 
the claimant must be able to demonstrate “an extremely strong prima facie case” the 
damage declared whether feared or incurred will be “very serious” and there will be 
“clear evidence” that the respondent has in his or her possession documentation or 
other things which incriminate them and there will be a “real possibility” that the 
defendants  may seek to destroy or remove such incriminating evidence prior to any 
inter partes application being made.80 It is often asserted that search orders 
constitute a near punitive imposition upon a respondent, particularly because 
they’re made without notice.81  
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3.24.3. When a search order is granted it is usually proper that service is made by a 
solicitor.82 Persons who are granted access to the respondent’s premise are generally 
limited to the named solicitor and none other than a specified number of persons 
who are authorised to do so by him or her, the particulars will vary from case to 
case.83 Access to the respondent’s premise is usually permitted to enable the 
authorised party to search for, inspect and take a copy of pre-specified documents, 
articles or some other property and/ or to remove pre-specified documents, articles 
or some other property; a respondent may also be required to deliver up keys, open 
lock-boxes or print-out information from computers.84 The respondent may also be 
ordered to give up the name and address of any person or persons or party who 
have been involved in specified dealings with the respondent and also to disclose 
details of those dealings,85 furthermore the respondent may be required to notify 
third parties that proceedings against him or her have commenced and/ or to warn 
them of the possibility that proceedings may be brought against them in the even 
that incriminating evidence comes to light.86  
 
3.24.4. Similarly to the NPO, search orders may be granted as an ancillary device, 
operative alongside a freezing order.87 However unlike the NPO a search order will 
not be be permitted as a means to establish what if any causes of action are 
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justified.88 It should be understood that there is no universally accepted search 
order. Rather, when an order is granted that order will be tailored to accommodate 
for the specific exigencies of that case in reference to such considerations as the 
likelihood that under normal processes documentation or materials or some other 
property could be concealed or disposed of by the respondent. These considerations 
are taken into account by a court prior to the order being granted in conjunction 
with a consideration of the level of hardship that an order may cause to the 
respondent as well as other considerations which are commonplace when exercising 
an equitable jurisdiction.89 The considerations touched upon in this section on the 
Anton Piller jurisdiction are not exhaustive but they serve to demonstrate that both 
practitioners and claimants should be cautious when considering whether or not to 
petition the courts for an order of this kind not least because the claimant must give 
an undertaking in damages90 and where the court deems it necessary he or she may 
have to support that undertaking by means of the provision of an adequate security 
such as a bond.91  
 
3.24.5. Anton Piller relief remains a contentious issue, largely because of its intrusive 
nature. Concerns raised have included anxieties in relation to the violation of a 
defendant’s right to privacy92 as protected by the European Convention of Human 
Rights 1950,93 as well as the damage which may be caused to their reputation as a 
                                                     
88
 Hytrac Conveyors Ltd v Conveyors International Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 44.  
89
 Spry (n 19) 396-436; 581-583. 
90
 Bhimji v Chatwani [1991] 1 WLR 989.  
91
 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380; Anton Piller (n 76). 
92
 Michael Wabwile, ‘Anton Piller Orders Revisited’ [2000] JBL 387, 396. 
93
 Article 8(1) however note the article does not purport to protect freedoms in absolute terms. 
96 
 
result of an order.94 Davies comments that the destruction of a defendant’s 
commercial reputation may disturbingly be an underlying motivating factor where a 
claimant seeks a search order.95 It has been asserted that when the freezing 
injunction and the search order are combined they are regarded as two of the law’s 
‘nuclear weapons’.96 Their potency is not disputed, it is true that although both 
operate ancillary to a primary action they are extraordinary remedies which will 
often have a decisive effect upon a case. It has even been asserted that their use is 
often instrumental in persuading an opposing party in civil proceedings to settle a 
claim for damages.97 It is accepted that the search order is a powerful weapon in the 
arsenal of the litigator however likening it to a nuclear weapon aligns by way of 
analogy to the submission herein that its use should be regarded as a last resort. 
Accordingly other less invasive options should be considered before a search order is 
considered98 such as a CPR 25.1 applications on notice to gain access and inspect the 
defendant’s premises.99 It is all too easy when reviewing case law or examining a 
practitioners’ text to identify the most powerful device as the perfect option for your 
purposes; this is not necessarily a fair appraisal where the same ultimate result can 
be achieved by less invasive means.  Search orders are now invariably considered to 
be a device which should only be utilised when there is a clear and justifiable basis 
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for that serious course of action and even then only after the most thorough judicial 
scrutiny.100                  
 
Writ ne exeat regno and Bayer Orders  
 
3.25.1. The ancient writ ne exeat regno order operates to prevent a defendant from 
going abroad. It is a device which has a longstanding equitable heritage. It was 
originally used exclusively for the political purposes of the Crown but by the 19th 
century its most frequent application was towards the objective of restraining 
debtors from evading obligations to creditors by fleeing the domestic jurisdiction.101 
The writ ne exeat regno is a device which is utilised with decreasing regularity. More 
common in the Commercial Courts is the use of a Bayer order102 which was 
established in Bayer AG v Winter and Ors.103 The Bayer order which may be granted 
to safeguard the effective execution of a search order operates to restrain a 
defendant from departing from the jurisdiction without the permission of the court. 
It requires a party to deliver up their passport and/ or other travel documents to the 
applicant’s solicitors. The order will ordinarily continue until injunctive or ancillary 
orders have been served and/ or until the necessary information has been obtained 
as stipulated in those orders.104   
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3.26. There is no doubt that the process of recovering assets is a formidable 
challenge. The convoluted schemes that debtors or fraudsters create in order to 
avoid making good an obligation can present a claimant with an intricate web of 
deception. This chapter has sought to demonstrate how such impediments can be 
overcome. In the quest to break through the barriers a claimant may be tempted to 
turn as hastily as possible towards a judgment order. An alternative approach has 
been established; to direct enquiry broadly to all persons or parties which may have 
become embroiled in a scheme to deprive or defraud; not as the immediate 
inclination may be, to focus intransigently upon a questionable transaction or to turn 
immediately towards a Mareva injunction. It is submitted that there are scenarios 
where a claimant should have serious regard for moving with all haste firstly to 
discover and to secondly freeze amenable assets before moving to seize them. 
 
3.27. Several ancillary orders can aid a claimant, a number were touched upon 
herein. It has been argued that the Mareva injunction can be particularly effective 
when it is used strategically in conjunction with a range of pre-trial interlocutory 
orders; it is part of a matrix of remedies which notionally form the ‘modern Mareva 
jurisdiction’. One such device, the Norwich Pharmacal order, enables a claimant to 
locate amenable assets via a third party who has innocently or unknowingly 
facilitated a wrongful act. That party is required to provide disclosure to the injured 
party which can help to shed light upon the trail of assets. The NPO is an extremely 
useful preparatory device and its value should not be overlooked by a practitioner 
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who is advising a potential Mareva claimant. The value of conducting a covert 
investigation should not be underestimated. There is a risk that a debtor or fraudster 
will attempt to spirit away amenable assets if they perceive that they are under 
suspicion. In order to reduce that risk the courts may grant a Gagging order to 
restrain a party who is the subject of an order from discussing or disclosing any 
aspect of that order to another party and/ or a Sealing order which prohibits the 
normal publicly available record of court proceedings. The use of secrecy orders 
enables the practitioner to conduct a covert investigation and the claimant to 
consider their options while reducing the potential for a shrewd debtor to frustrate a 
freezing order. Either one of the two secrecy orders may also be granted in 
conjunction with a freezing order.  
 
3.28. The Bankers Trust jurisdiction was also identified as an option where a 
claimant requires information which relates to the location of assets held by banks. 
Whilst its operation is similar to that of the NPO it is not as comprehensive in terms 
of the range of disclosure that it can elicit. Additional but limited information may be 
procured under the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879. Certainly where a 
comprehensive investigation is sought the NPO was established as the more suitable 
option.  
 
3.29. Where there is an extremely strong prima facie case that a very serious injury 
will be incurred and the courts can be convinced that there is clear evidence that a 
respondent possesses something which may incriminate that party, the courts may 
grant a search order under the Anton Piller jurisdiction. That search order authorises 
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a solicitor and other persons specified by the solicitor to enter the premise of the 
respondent to secure information which may otherwise be concealed or destroyed. 
The search order is an invaluable ancillary device where information in the 
respondent’s possession is likely to be influential at trial or where that information 
may lead to the discovery of an amenable asset trail. However, it must be noted that 
a search order is not a suitable means of establishing a cause of action. Orders which 
prevent a defendant from fleeing the jurisdiction until the resolution of a dispute 
were outlined. It was recognised that the Bayer order in particular may benefit a 
claimant when used to safeguard the effective execution of a search order. Anton 
Piller relief was found to be a contentious jurisdiction largely due to its invasive 
nature and the hardship that it can place upon the respondent; while it should not be 
sought after lightly it remains a proven and valuable option, especially when it is 
operating in conjunction with a freezing injunction in relation to a justifiable cause.  
 
3.30. At the outset of this chapter the difficulties faced by claimants who suspect 
that another party will ultimately renege on their obligations was reaffirmed in the 
context of the modern pan-global economic climate. It was established that 
technological innovations can facilitate swift transnational transactions, a reality 
which creates a greater opportunity for profit but also for risk. It is asserted that as 
the liberalisation and deregulation movements prosper globally the number of 
judgment debtors will increase. It was noted that on a global scale a party who seeks 
protection in a claim against a deceptive debtor is afforded scant protection. It is 
submitted that the challenges although daunting can be aided via the utilisation of 
those pre-trial interlocutory devices discussed herein; establishing who the 
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transgressors are, the nature and location of amenable assets or property and 
freezing those assets under the Mareva jurisdiction. So it is asserted that the English 
judiciary have answered the call for proportionate responses to the increased risks 
posed by improved technology and globalisation by fashioning erudite judicial 
remedies which allow a party to covertly and hastily protect their interests in assets 
which would otherwise be spirited away.  Moore claims that the availability of the 
matrix of remedies discussed throughout this chapter have contributed significantly 
towards the appeal of England as the preferred jurisdiction for numerous 
international traders who desire the reassurance and satisfaction afforded by a 
system which works to protect their rights.105 Milman explains that the Mareva 
jurisdiction also significantly contributes towards the utility of English common law in 
the context of transnational business failure, corporate collapse and insolvency;106 it 
strengthens the practically effective body of law which has developed to manage 
transnational corporate collapses, crises and failures.107       
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4.1. In Federal Bank of the Middle East Ltd v Hadkinson and Others Mummery LJ 
declared that the Mareva jurisdiction is: 
“designed to prevent injustice to a successful Claimant by 
preserving assets and funds and guarding so far as possible 
against the risk that they will be disposed of or dissipated 
before a judgment is satisfied so as to render ineffective the 
Claimant’s attempts to recover what is due to him”.1  
4.2. Mummery LJ’s statement certainly captures the spirit of the Mareva 
jurisdiction as discussed in the previous two chapters. Nonetheless, the courts are 
faced with the reality that no two defendants are the same and that individual cases 
bring with them distinct scenarios and varying levels of complexity. Furthermore, the 
assets which an applicant may wish to target in recovery for a subsisting debt also 
vary from case to case. The typical freezing order is formulated with the intention 
that it is operative upon all of a defendant’s assets irrespective of whether those 
assets are held in the defendant’s name and whether or not they are jointly or solely 
owned. The standard freezing order was drafted to encompass any asset which a 
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defendant has the authority to dispose of either directly or indirectly or that he has 
the power to deal with as though they were his own. The defendant is notionally 
considered to have such power in the case of a third party holding or controlling an 
asset in accordance with the defendant’s indirect or direct instructions. Though in 
practice as shall be discovered within this chapter, the Mareva jurisdiction can be 
potholed with difficulties which centre on whether or not an asset can be 
legitimately captured by the standard form freezing injunction, specifically in the 
case of third party holdings.     
 
4.3. This chapter surveys such difficulties, focusing upon the complications which 
are created by virtue of a corporate bodies’ separate persona at law. The extent to 
which corporate personality creates obstacles for Mareva claimants is viewed 
through the lens of a claimant seeking to freeze the assets of third party companies 
which are owned and controlled by the respondent to a freezing injunction. As shall 
be witnessed such scenarios have propagated ambiguity which has left claimants, 
practitioners and third parties in an unclear position; unsure as to whether or not a 
standard freezing injunction can capture third party assets. As shall be seen such 
ambiguity was exacerbated greatly when two contradictory judgments were 
delivered by High Court judges. The technical problems which the irreconcilable 
judgments created for banks in particular is deliberated as well as the extent to 






The difficulties presented by separate corporate personality  
 
4.4. A freezing injunction drafted in the standard form has the effect of restricting 
what the respondent may do with his assets:  
“the respondent’s assets include any asset which he has the 
power directly or indirectly to dispose of or deal with as if it 
were his own. The respondent is to be regarded as having 
such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in 
accordance with his direct or indirect instructions” 
4.5. It could be inferred that such a provision encompasses company assets in the 
scenario that a respondent deals with or disposes of assets held by a company which 
he controls and owns.  While the standard freezing injunction is formulated to 
capture a wide variety of assets, the courts have invariably faced difficulties which 
relate to the assets of a company and whether or not they are captured by the 
standard form freezing injunction because of the longstanding Salomon principle.2 
This problem has become a contentious issue even in the case of a defendant who is 
in control of a company and is also the sole shareholder. A layperson could be 
forgiven for coming to the conclusion that where a company has a single shareholder 
and that shareholder is also the chief controlling influence over that company, the 
assets of the company are to all intents and purposes that person’s, albeit by a 
convoluted route. However in Gas Lighting Improvement Co Ltd v Commissioners of 
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Inland Revenue3 Lord Summer declared that the notion that a company is merely an 
apparatus employed for the purposes of the shareholder is a “layman’s fallacy”.4  
 
4.6. The layperson’s assumption although perfectly understandable could not be 
considered to be trite law because of the peculiar nature of one of the foremost 
principles of English company law. It is established law that in England a company is 
both an association of its members and also an entity separate from its members. It 
is precisely because a company is considered to be an entity separate from its 
members that a legal persona is conferred upon it. Concisely, the company is a 
person in the eyes of the law. This phenomenon is referred to as separate corporate 
personality.5 Separate corporate personality is a concept which enables a company 
to make contracts and to be party to legal proceedings. The members of a company 
are separate from that company and as such they are not liable for its debts and they 
do not carry on its business. The most significant aspect of all to this body of work, is 
that company property is considered to belong not to the members, but to the 
company itself as a separate and distinct person. This feature of company law was 
considered by the House of Lords in Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd6. Lord 
Wrenbury stated that, “the corporator even if he holds all the shares is not the 
corporation… neither he nor any creditor of the company has any property legal or 
equitable in the assets of the corporation”.7  
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4.7. The question of the proprietary status of company assets has persisted 
nonetheless. The question arose following the founding of the Mareva jurisdiction, 
can the terms of a freezing injunction be considered to capture the assets of a body 
corporate? Where a respondent to a freezing order in standard terms organises a 
disposal of company assets which he or she owns and controls that defendant may 
be considered to be in breach of that freezing order; such a rubric may on the face of 
it run contrary to the doctrine of separate corporate personality. Conflicting views 
thereof crystallised when two irreconcilable judgments where delivered on the 6th 
June 2013. Both Group Seven Limited v Allied Investment Corporation Limited and 
Others8 and Lakatamia Shipping Company v Nobu Su and Others9 concerned the 
scope of a standard freezing order in respect of company assets.    
 
4.8. In Group Seven10 Hildyard J adopted a similar stance to Lord Wrenbury’s in 
Macaura11 and ruled that a respondent who organises the disposal of assets held by 
a company that he owns and controls would not be regarded as being in breach of a 
freezing injunction composed in the standard form. In stark contrast Burton J’s 
judgment in Lakatamia12 directed that such a respondent would be regarded as 
being in breach of the freezing injunction. The incompatible judgments created 
uncertainty for third parties. As shall be discussed in due course the ambiguity these 
two cases created, presented particular problems for banking organisations who are 
required to act when placed on notice of the terms of a freezing order.  
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The Group Seven case 
 
4.9. In Group Seven the respondent was a Mr Sultana who was the sole owner and 
director of Wealthstorm Limited. The claimant secured a freezing injunction against 
the respondents company. Following the order the respondent acted to procure that 
his company entered into an agreement to settle claims which the company had 
relating to a loan which was outstanding. The respondent’s actions effectively 
diminished the value of those assets to the company. As a result the claimant 
petitioned the court to commit the respondent for contempt of court, on the 
grounds that he had wilfully and intentionally breached the freezing order operating 
against him.  
 
4.10. Hildyard J’s judgment was twofold. Firstly he held that it was a clear and 
discernible fact the assets of the company were categorically not in accordance with 
the law the assets of the respondents. The corollary was therefore that he could not 
have possibly disposed of his assets. The second pivotal issue considered by Hildyard 
J was whether it was possible in the eyes of the law that the terms of the standard 
freezing injunction outlined in chapter two could vary that position.13 The judge 
measured whether a company with a single director, who owned every share in the 
company could hold or control that company’s assets according to the sole director 
and shareholder’s direct or indirect instructions subject to the meaning of that 
provision.14 According to Hildyard J such a reading was not permissible, he believed 
his position to be definitive and beyond reproach owing to “settled principles of 
                                                     
13
 Group Seven (n 8).  
14
 Ibid [65].    
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company law”,15 a rationale discoverable in those principles established in the 
seminal Salomon case touched upon earlier. His position was supported by the 
judgments of Rimer and Patten LJJ in the Court of Appeal judgment of Prest v Prest16 
which reaffirmed a company’s separate corporate personality, emphasising its status 
as near sanctified. This perspective on the primacy of separate corporate personality 
was further fortified by way of a clear declaration by Lord Neuberger to the same 
effect in the Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd.17  
 
4.11.  In line with the well-established doctrine the respondent company is to be 
regarded as having diminished its own assets, irrespective of the reality that the 
respondent had procured the company to enter into the disputed agreement; as a 
matter of law he was not instructing the company directly or indirectly to make the 
questionable disposition. In Prest v Prest Rimer LJ stated in reference to a company, 
“Those who control its affairs – even if the control is in a single individual – act 
merely as the company’s agents” and that company’s property “remains the 
property of the company and belongs beneficially to no one else…”18 Hence Hildyard 
J ruled that the respondent could not be held in contempt by virtue of breaching the 
freezing order as the property in question could only be considered to have once 
been the property of the company, thereof becoming that of the disponee, the 
disposition being made by the company and not the respondent. Hildyard J’s 
judgment could be considered to be dubious considering that Hildyard J came to the 
conclusion he did irrespective of that fact that as part of the list of assets provided 
                                                     
15
 Ibid.   
16
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1395.  
17
 [2013] UKSC 34.   
18
 Prest (n 16) [105]. 
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during the disclosure process the defendant had noted his interest in the loan made 
by the company.19 Hildyard J noted that his decision may ominously have the effect 
of diluting the “efficacy of the standard CPR form of freezing order and surprise and 
unsettle”.20  
 
The Lakatamia Case   
 
4.12. Burton J, presiding in the Lakatamia21 case adjudged a similar issue but arrived 
at an entirely different conclusion than that of his fellow High Court Judge in the 
Group Seven case. In Lakatamia the claimant had also been granted a freezing 
injunction in the standard form. Similarly to the Group Seven case it came to light 
that the respondent controlled the procurement of company assets held by 
companies that he owned, the issue therefore, as in Group Seven was whether the 
standard freezing injunction captured those assets. The longstanding Salomon 
principle was unsurprisingly presented as an embargo on the concept that a freezing 
injunction could be extended so as to capture assets held by a company which was 
owned or controlled by the respondent for the same reasons outlined in the Group 
Seven discussion above. It was further asserted that the Salomon line of 
argumentation was supported by the Court of Appeal judgment in Prest and the 
Supreme Court decision in VTB Capital Plc v Nutriek Int Corp.22  
 
                                                     
19
 David Sandy, ‘Going Head to Head’ (2014) 164 NLJ 13. 
20
 Group Seven (n 8) [65].  
21
 Lakatamia (n 9). 
22
 [2013] UKSC 5.      
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4.13. Burton J did not dispute the legitimacy of VTB, Prest and Salomon.  That aspect 
was not addressed per se, however he had no difficulty in finding that the assets held 
by those companies which were owned and controlled by the respondent were 
captured by the scope of the freezing order operating against the respondent. He 
stated: 
“I have no doubt… that the First Defendant effectively 
controls, and indirectly owns, the companies… which own the 
assets, the vessel and the shares which I have described, 
brings the position plainly, and intendedly, into the definition 
of paragraph 3 of the Order”.23  
4.14. Burton J delivered a tripartite judgment explaining why he considered the 
standard form freezing injunction to capture the company assets. Firstly, it was 
asserted that the Salomon principle was not offended by his judgment because it was 
dependent upon a traditional analysis of company law wherein the companies’ 
owner could by a resolution at a general meeting dictate the future of the company’s 
assets held by a company which he owned or controlled. Secondly, where a 
respondent effected the disposition of assets held by that company he would be 
effectively diminishing the value of his own assets, specifically the shareholding in 
that company.  
 
4.15.-Thirdly, he presented a concept which was discussed in Parbulk II AS v PT 
Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi TBK and other companies,24 which directed that 
                                                     
23
 Lakatamia (n 9) [16] 
24
 [2011] EWHC 3143 (Comm).  
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where a claimant has the benefit of a freezing injunction, he or she can extend that 
order so as to capture the assets of a company which is owned or controlled by the 
defendant on the grounds that the claimant may, in due course be in a position to 
execute its judgment against the shares in the defendants company itself. In that 
respect such a judgment merely preserves the status quo until such time as a final 
order is made. Pursuant to this tripartite line of reasoning Burton J ruled that the 
assets held by the companies owned and controlled by the respondent were 
properly captured by the standard terms of the freezing injunction operating for the 
claimant.         
 
The difficulties created by these conflicting judgments  
 
4.16. Clearly the two judgments of the High Court are incompatible. Such 
irreconcilable case law muddies the waters casting ambiguity upon the legal 
landscape, leaving claimants, respondents and practitioners in a difficult position. 
Hildyard J’s conclusion was influenced heavily by Prest and VTB; significant cases 
which champion the sanctity of separate corporate identity. Burton J’s decision is 
one underscored by judicial pragmatism;25 declaring that the respondent was barred 
from making a disposition of assets held by a company which he owned and 
controlled. It should perhaps be appreciated that Hildyard J did not have the benefit 
of the second submission heard by Burton J, being the concept that the disposition of 
assets by a company which was held by the respondent to a freezing injunction 
would effectively constitute a diminution in the value of that asset, namely his 
                                                     
25
 Emily Gillett, ‘Freezing Orders and Third Parties -- Casting the Net Just Wide Enough’ (2014) 8 
JIBFL 518, 519.  
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shareholding in that company. In that respect Burton J had the benefit of being able 
to consider an erudite submission from counsel for the claimants whereas Hildyard J 
did not.    
 
4.17. In his decision Burton J considered the idea that a judgment creditor may in 
executing a judgment choose to appoint a receiver over the interests of the 
respondent, in the company over which he had control, meaning that the freezing 
injunction would extend to obstruct any dealings by the respondent in that company. 
It is worth noting that Burton J cited certain authorities in support of this line of 
reasoning which were perhaps properly directed towards a different question 
namely whether a freezing injunction could be issued to operate against a ‘non-cause 
of action defendant’; not as was suggested, whether a freezing injunction’s terms 
prohibited the respondents dealings in the assets of the company in concern, if such 
a company was not itself a party to proceedings. On the other hand Hildyard J made 
a very sensible suggestion in his judgment being that a claimant could consider the 
drafting of a variation to the standard form to prevent a company which was owned 
by a respondent from dealing and or disposing of its assets on the grounds that the 
assets held by that company may in the future become the target of an order for the 
purposes of enforcement. In so doing Hildyard J was describing the Chabra 
jurisdiction.26 Chabra orders take their name from TSB Private Bank International SA 
v Chabra.27 The Chabra order will receive further attention in due course. For now it 
is sufficient to comment that such an instrument can be extraordinarily effective, 
                                                     
26
 TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 2 All ER 245; for a recent explanation see, 
Parbulk II AS v PT Humpuss Intermoda Transporasi TBK & Ors [2011] EWHC 3143 (Comm).    
27
 [1992] 2 All ER 245.  
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enabling a claimant to join a party to whom there is no direct cause of action as a 
‘non-cause of action defendant’ to the freezing injunction on the grounds that the 
third party is holding an asset or assets which may become amenable for the 
purposes of execution in favour of a judgment creditor in due course.    
 
The implications of the conflicting judgments for Banks as third parties, a closer 
look 
 
4.18. Banks are invariably placed in a challenging position when effecting the terms 
of a freezing injunction. Banks must respond quickly, making prompt and critical 
decisions soon after receiving notice of a freezing injunction. Laville explains that 
their task is especially difficult where a customer’s undertakings are conducted via 
numerous entities and bank accounts.28 On the one hand a bank must act in 
compliance with the terms of the injunction. On the other hand that bank must 
consider the obligations it owes to its customer in terms of data protection; such 
obligations remain operative unless they are specifically contradicted by the 
injunction. Whether or not a claimant can rely on a bank to preserve defendant’s 
assets is of the utmost importance because as Capper states that preservation is 
what “really makes the injunction ‘stick’”.29      
 
4.19. A bank or another third party may become bound by a freezing order in one of 
two primary ways. Most commonly, a claimant will issue proceedings and obtain a 
freezing order against a defendant, substantive relief being sought thereof. That 
                                                     
28
 Roger Laville, ‘Freezing Orders and the Corporate Veil’ (2013) 9 JIBFL 565. 
29
 David Capper, ‘Tort Liability for Breaching Asset Freezing Injunctions’ (2005) 64 CLJ 26. 
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defendant is known as a cause of action defendant or ‘CAD’.30 Once the order is 
made the claimant will usually serve the CAD’s bank with notice of that order, 
ensuring provision of a copy of the order to the bank. Upon receipt of said notice the 
bank becomes bound by the court’s order. A freezing injunction captures assets held 
by a bank or third party where there is a legal or beneficial interest enjoyed over 
those assets by the CAD. A bank is bound not as a party to the order; rather it is 
bound because if it or any third party takes steps with knowledge of that order which 
has the effect of frustration, then that party will find itself in contempt of court.31 It is 
important to note however that the decision in HM Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise v Barclays Bank plc,32 directs that where a bank unintentionally or negligently 
allows a CAD to breach an order, that bank will be neither liable in damages nor held 
in contempt of court.  
 
4.20. As an alternative to the first scenario a claimant may choose to invoke the 
Chabra jurisdiction and add a bank or another third party to the proceedings as a 
named defendant. This can be done irrespective of the fact that no substantive relief 
is pursued from that party. The bank or third party would hence become a non-cause 
of action defendant (NCAD).33 Pursuant to the Chabra jurisdiction a claimant may 
freeze an asset which is held by an NCAD even in the case of a CAD who does not 
enjoy any legal or beneficial interest in the assets. Invocation of the Chabra 
jurisdiction against an NCAD bank is of great benefit to a claimant where it is likely 
that they will be able to obtain a judgment which permits targeting the assets held 
                                                     
30
 Chabra (n 26). 
31
 Capper (n 29).   
32
 [2006] UKHL 28. 
33
  Chabra (n 26). 
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by the NCAD in order to satisfy the judgment. Such a process would be most 
common in the case of an NCAD who is the creditor of the CAD or in possession of 
assets which the CAD transferred in fraud of creditors. It should be noted that it is 
not normally necessary to utilise the Chabra jurisdiction where a bank is concerned 
because a bank is usually under no illusion as to the identity of their customers and 
are ordinarily very astute when it comes to complying with a freezing injunction. 
Nonetheless, the Chabra jurisdiction can be invoked to great effect against an entity 
which is owned or controlled by the primary defendant but holds assets beneficially, 
such as a company.34    
 
4.21. In the interim period between the delivery of the irreconcilable judgments in 
the Group Seven and Lakatamia cases and resolution being tendered by a higher 
appellate court, banks and other third party groups who were placed on notice of the 
terms of a freezing injunction would be put in a precarious position. Pragmatically 
the threat to a bank of being found liable following the conflicting decisions may be 
regarded as slight where a bank chooses to follow the Group Seven approach over 
Lakatamia, refusing to freeze company assets which a CAD controls and owns. Laville 
observes that it is more likely that an aggrieved customer will sue a bank for breach 
of mandate if the bank follows Lakatamia and freezes the CAD’s company assets than 
it is for the bank to be found liable in tort or contempt for not doing so.35  Sandy 
stresses the difficult position faced by banks because of the conflicting judgments 
                                                     
34
 HM Revenue & Customs v Egleton [2006] EWHC 2313 (Ch); 1 All ER 606 [12] (Briggs J).   
35
 Laville (n 28) 567. 
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which left banks in the dark as to whether to freeze company assets in the case of a 
respondent who wholly owned and controlled a company.36  
 
The Court of Appeal Provides Third Party Resolution  
 
4.22. Two unrelated cases considering novel but comparable scenarios being handed 
down on the same day by two judges of equal standing apparently unaware that 
such a similar case was being heard at the same time, was as Tomlinson LJ stated, a 
“coincidence”.37 That those two judges of equal standing happened to reach such 
incompatible conclusions must therefore be considered an unfortunate coincidence. 
Resolution on the question at hand came when the first defendant in the Lakatamia 
case appealed the decision of Burton J. 
 
4.23. The Court of Appeal subsequently dismissed the first defendant Mr Su’s appeal 
and continued the injunction granted by Burton J but their Lord Justices did not 
entirely agree with Burton J’s conclusions. During his delivery of the leading 
judgment Tomlinson LJ commented that he could not support the reasoning in 
paragraph 16 of Burton J’s J judgment. He regarded it as improper to assert that the 
assets held by the non-defendant companies were “plainly and intendedly” within 
the scope of the term ‘assets’ covered by paragraph 3 of the freezing order.38 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that Burton J was correct to declare that the 
injunction did capture the impugned assets but not because of the rationale of 
paragraph 16. Rather the orders capture of these assets was properly accepted for 
                                                     
36
 Sandy (n 19). 
37
 Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Su and others [2014] EWCA Civ 636 [9]. 
38
 Lakatamia (n 37) [26].  
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the reasons advanced by Burton J in paragraph 17 of his judgment. The assets were 
frozen for the salient reason that dealing with them prospered the genuine reality 
that they would be diminished, which would in turn cause a diminution in the value 
of the shareholdings in the non-defendant companies. Interestingly that same 
reasoning had had previously been advanced by the Court of Appeal in JSC BTA Bank 
v Solodchenko.39  
 
4.24. The most important aspect of Tomlinson LJ’s judgment herein was the 
clarification it delivered on the contentious issues which arise out of paragraph 6 of 
the standard form freezing injunction which will now be discussed. Paragraph 5 of 
the standard form order prohibits the respondent from disposing of, dealing with or 
diminishing the value of any of his assets. Paragraph 6 states that:  
“Paragraph 5 applies to all the Respondent’s assets whether 
or not they are in his own name and whether they are solely 
or jointly owned. For the purpose of this order the 
Respondent’s assets include any asset which he has the 
power, directly or indirectly to dispose of or deal with as if it 
where his own. The Respondent is to be regarded as having 
such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in 
accordance with his direct or indirect instructions.” 
4.25. Tomlinson LJ confirmed that there are no grounds on which it can be affirmed 
that the wording of these two provisions have the effect or were intended to have 
the effect of catching within the definition of a defendant’s assets, the assets of a 
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 [2011] 1 ELR 888. 
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company which he controlled and owned; such assets were categorically not 
“directly affected” by such an order as Burton J had inadvertently inferred. So the 
Lakatamia freezing injunction was upheld only on the basis that dealing with those 
assets had the latent potential to diminish Mr Su’s shareholdings in them. Therefore 
the judgment does not alter the well-established proprietary status quo of a 
company’s assets in line with the Salomon principle; although such a finding is largely 
unsurprising.    
 
4.26. In this respect the legal landscape is clearer for individuals and businesses who 
use investment vehicles, holding companies and various other corporate structures. 
The Court of Appeal has un-muddied the waters and defined the extent to which 
company assets may be captured by the standard form freezing injunction 
terminology. In essence the assets of a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary 
which is the subject of a freezing injunction are not directly touched or frozen by a 
standard form injunction, nor is the subsidiary directly caught by its ambit. Rimer LJ 
stated that an understanding of “control” on the contrary conflicts with the 
fundamental principles of the law of companies and separate corporate personality. 
So ends the ambiguity tendered by the opposing judgments of Hildyard and Burton J 
in that respect. That being said a person whom a freezing order is operating against 
must be evermore mindful not to act so as to intendedly or otherwise diminish the 
value of an asset even if that asset is held not by them but by a company that they 
own and control because to do so, more clearly now than before, contradicts the 
terms of the standard form freezing injunction in line with the guidance given by the 




4.27. What should also be noted about the Court of Appeal decision in Lakatamia are 
certain obiter comments of Sir Bernard Rix which endorse an earlier submission:  
“Where a Defendant’s alleged liability is not merely that in 
the ordinary way of a party liable in debt or damages but is 
said to arise out of the misappropriation of funds or some 
such dishonesty, as in the Ablyazov litigation, it will often be 
possible to request the court to make orders in wider terms 
and/ or to make the Defendant’s corporate creatures 
Defendants themselves. But in the more ordinary case, even 
where a freezing order is justified under its standard 
rationale, that does not extend to freezing the assets of other 
parties or corporate non- Defendants.”40  
 
4.28. Sir Bernard Rix’s comments tender two very important points which crystallise 
in the event that a claimant wishes to freeze the assets of a non-defendant company, 
he or she must be ready to: 
 either make a sufficient case indicating that the company concerned is 
nothing more that the “money-box” of the defendant and thus holds assets 
to which the defendant is in point of fact beneficially entitled, 
 and/ or consider joining that company to proceedings itself under the 
aforementioned Chabra jurisdiction.41 
 
                                                     
40 Lakatamia (n 37) [42].  





4.29. During the course of this chapter it has become plainly obvious that separate 
corporate personality, one of the cornerstones of English Company law can pose 
problems for a variety of interested parties where freezing injunctions are 
concerned. The principal problem herein was that of the proprietary status of 
company assets in the case of a respondent to a standard form freezing injunction 
who also owns and controls that company. It was unclear whether or not the 
standard form injunction could capture such assets within its ambit. The disparity in 
this area was worsened when two incompatible judgments were delivered on the 
same day by judges of equal standing in the High Court. On the one hand, Hildyard J 
adopted a conservative position in Group Seven, holding that a respondent who 
arranges for the disposition of assets held by a company that he owns and controls 
would not be captured by a standard form freezing injunction. Conversely Burton J’s 
pragmatic reasoning underscored his declaration that such a scenario would permit 
for those assets to be captured. It became apparent that ambiguity in this area 
presented problems for litigants and also third parties, banks in particular, who must 
make informed decisions promptly when placed on notice of the terms of a freezing 
injunction. On the one hand Hildyard J’s judgment suggested that a bank should not 
freeze non-defendant company’s assets because to do so would be contrary to the 
well-established Salomon principle. On the other hand, Burton J’s judgment 
suggested that for a bank to freeze such assets, fell plainly and intentionally within 




4.30. Resolution was delivered when the Court Appeal continued the injunction 
which was upheld by Burton J in the Lakatamia case. Their Lord Justices made two 
significant points. Firstly they held that Burton J was incorrect in his suggestion that 
the assets held by a non-defendant company were clearly and intentionally captured 
by the wording of a standard form freezing injunction. However they ultimately held 
that Burton J’s second limb was agreeable. He was right to hold that the injunction 
did capture the impugned assets by virtue of the fact that dealing with them 
prospered the genuine possibility that they would be diminished which would 
thereby cause a diminution in the value of his shareholdings in the non-defendant 
companies. The invocation of the Chabra jurisdiction was a notion of particular value 
to claimants which was considered by Hildyard J in Group Seven and Sir Bernard Rix 
during the Lakatamia appeal. Accordingly, claimants and practitioners advising 
claimants should seriously consider joining third parties as NCAD’s to any 
proceedings. In so doing a claimant would be able to target third parties who hold 
assets which may become amenable for payment during the enforcement process. 
Invoking the Chabra jurisdiction in this way would avoid the need to go down the 
Lakatamia route entirely, simplifying the process for all parties involved.    
 
4.31. It could be suggested that the mere fact that the ambiguity discussed herein 
ever came to light in the first place was an occurrence indicative of a flawed legal 
system. However it is submitted that rather than being regarded negatively or 
characterised as a blatant case of judicial vacillation, the alternate judgments of 
Hildyard and Burton J were simply telling signs of a commercial legal system which 
works to respond to the dynamic nature of commercial transactions. In that respect 
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the Chancery Court was operating with the elastic principles of equity which offer the 
capacity to evolve with the constantly changing nature of modern commerce. At the 
core of the two judgments was a desire by one means or another to combat the 
sophisticated, dishonest dealings of debtors and fraudsters, to protect the spirit of 
justice; while Hildyard J signposted the Chabra jurisdiction, Burton J attempted to 
combat the matter in a more direct manner. What should be appreciated is that 
whilst the two judgments were prima facie incompatible, both judgments advocated 
features later supported by the Court of Appeal. Namely, Hildyard J’s suggestion of 
invoking the Chabra jurisdiction and Burton J’s second limb vis-à-vis the diminution 
of an asset by the third party route. In that respect the contrary nature of Group 
Seven and Lakatamia need not be reduced to a figurative battle between the seminal 
Salomon principle on one side of the battlefield and judicial pragmatism on the 
other. Rather as a dynamic and progressive judicial process. After all, if the legal 
system were an impeccable machinery then there would be no need for the various 
appellate levels of jurisdiction to exist. All matters would be resolved without issue at 
the trial of the first instance. However ours is a legal system that has prospered and 
one which persists in jurisdictions across the globe, the discourse herein 
demonstrates and legitimises the English commercial legal system which 
progressively seeks to interpret the law and scrutinise its own decisions in order to 
evolve and realise a more complete form of justice.          
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
5.1. The first broad objective of this thesis was to establish how and why the 
Mareva injunction was established. It was acknowledged that the Mareva injunction 
was categorised as an equitable remedy. The corollary of that recognition was the 
crystallisation of an idea; in order to develop a deeper understanding of the Mareva 
injunction it would be necessary to generate a perception of the equitable 
jurisdiction itself. That perception was cultivated by researching what equity is, how 
equity came to be and why it was required; the research thereof produced a broad 
overview of the equitable jurisdiction. It is clear now that acquiring that overview 
was crucial. As noted, the Mareva jurisdiction was constructed upon equitable 
foundations, it necessarily followed that within the equitable jurisdiction lay a fuller 
understanding of the nature of Mareva relief. The insight gained by means of the 
research conducted during Chapter One is considered to be a fundamental feature of 
this body of work. The abovementioned model proved to be fruitful. Equity became a 
thematic conceptual framework and a valuable discourse was rendered upon it; a 
discussion which explicated how and to some extent why the Mareva injunction was 
created.  
 
5.2. Equity was found to be a supplementary system with the capacity to repair 
defects in the law. It was noted in Chapter One that equity can legitimate or qualify 
the administration and application of the law by compelling those who are party to 
proceedings to submit to a more conscionable and complete form of justice than the 
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law alone can elicit. To elaborate, the generality of prescribed and inflexible rules 
occasionally fall short of offering appropriate solutions to the diverse array of 
scenarios which arise in everyday life. Pausing to relate that submission with the 
facts in Karageorgis1 provides a comparable scenario. The Japanese applicants in the 
case were owed money by debtors who had failed to meet their payment 
obligations, in spite of the fact that the creditor applicants had discovered that the 
debtors had sufficient funds held in a London bank to meet their obligations. The 
money held in that bank account constituted an amenable source of recompense in 
the event of the likely judgement award. The problem was that in the interim period 
between the commencement of inter parties proceedings and the ensuing 
judgement award the debtor defendants would be free to deal with those funds as 
they wished. The defendants could with all right remove their assets from the 
jurisdiction and in so doing they would render the ensuing judgement award 
ineffective.  
 
5.3. On the one hand there was a prescribed and restrictive rule which directed 
that a party to proceedings could not be barred from dealing with, dissipating or 
disposing of their assets as they saw fit,2 even if adhering to that restrictive position 
had the inadvertent effect of thwarting the possibility of justified recompense. On 
the other hand if the court could grant an interlocutory order which prohibited the 
                                                     
1
 [1975] 3 All ER 282; although the injunction received its namesake from a later case in the same year:  
Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarries SA Judgments delivered 23
rd
 June 1975 in 
the Court of Appeal reported [1980] 1 All ER 213. 
2
 Although note that while protective proprietary principles are certainly highly regarded in England 
they are not peculiar to English law. The ‘right to peaceful enjoyment of property’ is a principle 
protected by international law under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art 1 First 
Protocol. However, pursuant to that provision the state may act in a manner which impairs the 
proprietary right of disposal on a temporary basis in order to further the public interest or subject to the 
conditions provided for by law. 
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defendant from dealing with, dissipating or disposing of an asset on a temporary 
basis, until a judgment award then the amenable asset(s) could be preserved and the 
administration of justice could be safeguarded. Patently, the generality of the 
prescribed restrictive rubric which barred the relief had the collateral effect of 
impeding the administration of justice. It was argued that the court’s longstanding 
unwillingness to grant such an order when the scenario clearly called for injunctive 
relief exposed a defect in the law and that defect stood contrary to the maxim 
‘equity will not suffer a wrong to be done without a remedy’. When the Court of 
Appeal granted the injunction which restrained the removal of the impugned asset 
from the jurisdiction it was exercising a residuary equitable power which aligned with 
principles fashioned in the old courts of the Chancery. The essence of the statutory 
provision relied upon by Lord Denning which authorised his court to grant an 
injunction where it was “just or convenient” was of unmistakably equitable stock. Its 
supplication in Karageorgis had the effect of repairing a defect in the law, thereby 
upholding the administration of justice, compelling the defendants to yield to a more 
conscionable and complete form of justice.  
 
5.4. The first broad objective was really composed of two parts. If the two 
components of the objective are dealt with in turn then it becomes apparent that the 
objective questioned why the Mareva injunction was developed; concisely, it was 
found that the injunction was first ordered to counterbalance an apparent defect in 
the law which adversely prejudiced creditors. The next component of the first broad 
objective asked how the Mareva injunction was developed; it was developed 
126 
 
primarily by the judiciary (chiefly Lord Denning’s Court of Appeal)3 and was 
subsequently codified in section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Today the 
availability of the Modern freezing injunction in practice is governed largely by the 
Civil Practice Rules (CPR) which were introduced in 1999, specifically Part 25 and 
Practice Direction 25A.           
  
5.5. The second objective was to establish why the Mareva injunction is regarded 
as an extraordinarily effective device. It is argued that there is an interaction 
between the first and second broad objectives. Part of the reason that the Mareva 
jurisdiction is considered to be so effective is precisely because of its ancestry as an 
equitable remedy; it possesses an elasticity which characterises the equitable 
jurisdiction allowing for the formation of practically effective remedies. By way of 
analogy, for an exercise in product design to be considered a success it should result 
in the design of a product which is fit for purpose. Arguably an exercise in the design 
of equitable remedies should similarly result in the formation of relief which is 
commensurate to the problems it seeks to resolve. It was discovered that the 
Mareva injunction was essentially developed to combat attempts by deceptive 
debtors to defeat likely judgement awards. The Mareva injunction was designed to 
be effective, taking in to consideration the stimuli which expedited its development.  
 
5.6. The primary purpose of the Mareva injunction appeared to be simple; to stop 
deceptive debtors from removing amenable assets from beyond the jurisdiction on a 
temporary basis prior to a likely judgement award. While the purpose is clear and 
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 Under s. 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 which repeated the essence 




seems relatively straightforward, further analysis found that the solution was more 
complicated. It is commonly the case that an impugned asset is held on behalf of the 
debtor by a bank. This highlighted a problem because while the primary defendant 
can be ordered not to deal with an asset the risk still remains that they may disobey 
the court’s order, withdraw their funds and spirit the asset(s) away if there is the 
potential to do so. Accordingly, for the Mareva injunction to be effective it would 
have to touch both the bank and the defendant. This performance criterion was 
effected by way of a mandamus which operates upon a bank, requiring that they do 
not allow the defendant to deal with that asset beyond the terms of the order until 
the matter is resolved. The bank is not a primary defendant and so binding them also 
presented an issue; that issue was solved simply by the implication that if a bank 
knowingly or negligently assists in the breach of the court’s order then it would be 
found in contempt of court and may also risk proceedings for dishonest assistance.  
 
5.7. It was discovered that where a creditor has become convinced that a debtor 
is going to renege upon their duty to make payment, circumstances have often 
already deteriorated to the point whereby a creditor considers the debtor to be 
dishonest and deceptive. If the debtor becomes apprehensive that they are under 
suspicion then they may act with all haste to circumvent the effectiveness of a 
freezing injunction by removing or dealing with their asset before a court can make 
an order which would have the effect of rendering both the interlocutory order and a 
likely judgement award futile.4 Accordingly, for a Mareva injunction to be effective it 
must be swift and covert. That performance criterion is met by the propensity of the 
                                                     
4
 See, Paul David Wood & Anor v Timothy Darren Baker & Ors [2015] EWHC 2536 (Ch) [10] (Hodge J).  
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courts to grant a Mareva injunction ex parte. The fact that a Mareva injunction is 
ordinarily ordered without the knowledge of the primary defendant makes it 
extremely effective because by the time they become aware of the order their bank 
has already been placed on notice. However, the lack of a balanced adversarial 
discourse in ex parte proceedings of this nature has been the subject of criticism.5 In 
response it is noted that the courts accede to those abovementioned points and 
consequentially the ex parte application entails a higher threshold than an inter 
parties application; an applicant is also commonly subject to a cross-undertaking in 
damages and the courts may impose an additional requirement that the cross-
undertaking is ‘fortified’ for example by way of a bank guarantee.6 Alternatively, the 
courts may decide that a limited cross-undertaking in damages is appropriate; the 
decision is based on the court’s assessment of what is fair.7 Ultimately, a defendant 
can apply to have a Mareva injunction discharged where the basis of a successful ex 
parte application was in fact flawed; in that scenario the applicant may also incur loss 
as a result of their cross-undertakings in damages. Prospective Mareva applicants 
must bear in mind the court’s readiness to hold to account those who 
inappropriately seek, obtain and enforce Mareva injunctions. So while contention 
surrounds the without-notice aspect of Mareva applications, the courts are careful to 
balance and protect the interests of both parties.  
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Gee notes that an ex parte application may be regarded as being contrary to the principles of natural 
justice because of the lack of a balanced adversarial discourse see, Steven Gee, Commercial Injunctions 
(Formerly Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief) (Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 14. 
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 A recent Court of Appeal case provides confirmation of the appropriate three stage test to be applied 
where a court is to decide whether to order fortification see, Energy Ventures Partners Ltd v Malabu 
Oil & Gas Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1295, also see Hone and Ors v Abbey Forwarding Ltd and Another 
[2014] EWCA Civ 711 which confirms the usual contractual approach (including as to remoteness of 
damage) in a courts assessment of compensation under a cross-undertaking in damages in the case of a 
Mareva order.  
7
 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Sergi Viktorovicch Pugachev [2015] EWCA Civ 139 [77] 




5.8. The response to the second broad objective is thus; the Mareva injunction is 
regarded as an extraordinarily effective device because it is a bespoke remedy. It was 
tailor made to combat the difficulties which expedited its development and as a 
result it was very effective at dealing with the problems which were evident in the 
time of its initiation. Therein lies the utility of the third broad objective. If the courts 
address the modern Mareva case in the very same way as they did Karageorgis8 or 
Mareva9  40 years ago then it is unlikely that the Mareva injunction would be 
regarded as so potently effective because the nature of the typical Mareva case is 
fundamentally different today than it was in 1975. It is argued that continuing high 
regard for the Mareva jurisdiction has been largely dependent upon the court’s 
ability to respond to the changing nature of the developing world.     
     
5.9. In Chapter Three the significance of the third broad objective became 
apparent. Nothing which follows should detract from the overriding impression 
generated by way of the combined impact of the fledgling Mareva cases discussed 
throughout Chapter two. The early Mareva cases tendered a radical innovation 
within the very fabric of the civil litigation process in England and in that respect they 
are considered to be pivotal; turning the tables in favour of the injured creditor. 
Nonetheless, Chapter Three established that in order to remain effective the Mareva 
jurisdiction had to alter in order to respond to the diverse array of scenarios which 
fell before the courts as time progressed. 
 
                                                     
8





5.10. The original Mareva cases concerned foreign based debtors who had assets 
located at banks within the English jurisdiction. The argument thereof was perhaps 
notionally more convincing than where a person was both resident within the 
jurisdiction and held assets within the jurisdiction owing to their undeniably limited 
ties to the jurisdiction. Over the course of time the scope of the Mareva injunction 
expanded in order to touch a wider array of domiciled defendants. Devonshire’s 
observation that all debtors, irrespective of their country of residence may attempt 
to evade the effect of a judgement of the court is apt.10 Irrespective of residency, the 
fact remains that dishonest debtors may attempt to defeat an eventual judgement 
award. A number of cases discussed in Chapter Two were found to have been 
significant in the further development of the jurisdiction.11 These cases gradually 
extended the Mareva jurisdiction, establishing that whether a defendant was a 
resident within the jurisdiction or outside of the jurisdiction, so long as they had 
assets within the jurisdiction then the court could act to restrain their disposal 
pending a judgment. A milestone judicial innovation occurred in 1990 when the 
English Court of Appeal upheld a decision which extended the remit of the Mareva 
injunction on an international or worldwide basis to capture a defendant’s assets 
which were located in foreign jurisdictions. The institution of the World Wide 
Mareva jurisdiction helped to balance the scales in favour of creditors regardless of 
the locale of a debtor or an amenable asset; far from fledgling, the Mareva injunction 
had taken flight.      
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 Peter Devonshire, ‘Pre-Emptive Orders against Evasive Dealings: An Assessment of Recent Trends’ 
[2004] JBL 357–377, 359. 
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 See, Gebr Van Weelde Scheepavaart Kantoor BV v Homeric Marine Services Ltd, The Agrabele 
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bin Turki al Sudairy v Abu-Taha [1980] 1 WLR 1268, Siskina v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] 




5.11. In Chapter One it was asserted that one of the most valuable aspects of the 
equitable jurisdiction was its innate capacity to respond to an atypical scenario or 
original case with a commensurate response. Sir George Jessel MR supported that 
submission when he commented that equity is a progressive jurisdiction because 
equitable principles may accommodate contemporary scenarios.12 In Chapter Three 
the manifestation of that concept was discussed: the contemporary world was 
surveyed in relation to the modern Mareva jurisdiction and the range of pre-trial 
interlocutory and ancillary orders which can make it effective. It was restated that 
the typical scenarios which give rise to a Mareva application are different now than 
40 years ago. The emerging pan-global economy was found to enable increasingly 
intricate commercial transactions to be established. It was explained that a modern 
debtor can construct increasingly convoluted schemes to avoid the obligations which 
they rightly owe to their creditors. As a result, organisations and individuals can 
profit through skilfully constructed international deals which utilise sophisticated 
technologies allowing a dishonest debtor to spirit away financial assets anonymously 
and instantaneously. Creditors are faced with intricate webs of deception 
characterised by electronic transfers and proprietary conversions often with inter-
jurisdictional dimensions. It was discovered that asset tracing is the process by which 
the claimant demonstrates what has happened to their property, identifying the 
proceeds and the parties who have handled, or received it. An asset tracing exercise 
justifies the applicant’s claim, establishing that the proceeds may be properly 
regarded as representing their property, allowing them to target those proceeds in 
recompense. It was witnessed that the courts have developed a range of orders 
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 Re Hallett’s Estate (1879-80) LR 13 Ch D 696 [710] (Sir George Jessel MR).  
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which are generally available to assist in the exercise of civil asset tracing which 
include the modern freezing order both domestic and worldwide.   
 
5.12. The Norwich Pharmacal order assists the claimant to locate amenable assets 
through a third party who has innocently or unknowingly facilitated a wrongful act. 
That party is obligated to provide disclosure to the injured party which can help to 
illuminate the trail of assets. The NPO was established to be an extremely useful 
preparatory device; its value must not be overlooked by a practitioner who is 
advising a potential Mareva claimant. The value of conducting a covert investigation 
should not be underestimated. As mentioned earlier there is a risk that a debtor or 
fraudster will attempt to remove amenable assets from the jurisdiction if they 
perceive that they are under suspicion. In order to further reduce that risk it was 
recognised that the courts may grant a Gagging order to restrain a party who is the 
subject of an order from discussing or disclosing any aspect of that order to another 
party and/ or a Sealing order which prohibits the customary publicly of court 
proceedings. The use of secrecy orders safeguards a covert operation providing the 
claimant with time to consider their options while reducing the potential for a debtor 
to frustrate a freezing order. The Bankers Trust jurisdiction was also identified as an 
option where a claimant requires information which relates to the location of assets 
held by banks. Its operation is similar to that of the NPO but it is not as wide-ranging 
in terms of the disclosure that it can elicit. Additional but limited information may be 
procured under the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879. Where a comprehensive 




5.13. Where there is an extremely strong prima facie case that a very serious injury 
will be incurred and the courts can be convinced that there is clear evidence that a 
respondent possesses information or materials which may incriminate that party, the 
courts my grant a search order via the Anton Piller jurisdiction. A search order 
authorises a solicitor and other persons specified by the solicitor to enter the 
premise of the respondent to secure information which could otherwise be 
concealed or destroyed. The search order was found to be an invaluable ancillary 
device where information in the respondent’s possession is likely to be influential at 
trial or where that information could lead to the discovery of an amenable asset trail. 
However, it must be noted that a search order is not a suitable means of establishing 
a cause of action. Orders which prevent a defendant from fleeing the jurisdiction 
until the resolution of a dispute were outlined. It was recognised that the Bayer 
order in particular may be beneficial to the claimant who seeks to safeguard the 
effective execution of a search order.  
 
5.14. Anton Piller relief is a contentious jurisdiction largely due to its invasive 
nature and the hardship that it can place upon the respondent; while it should not be 
sought after lightly it is a proven effective option, especially  when it operating in 
conjunction with a freezing injunction in relation to a justifiable cause. The strategic 
value of each device discussed in Chapter Three must not be underestimated or 
overlooked but the Anton Piller order in particular was found to have a potent 
strategic value and its use may have a decisive effect upon the outcome of a dispute; 
often eliciting an out of court settlement. The range of ancillary and connected 
orders discussed in Chapter Three should be strongly considered by the practitioner 
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because whether they are employed strategically on a preparatory basis prior to 
proceedings or on an interlocutory basis they can render the Mareva injunction even 
more effective.     
  
5.15. The insight gained by way of the combined impact of this thesis’ first three 
broad objectives is the realisation that the Mareva jurisdiction is truly progressive. 
That recognition exposes how the courts ensure that the Mareva jurisdiction remains 
an effective one and in so doing provides the response to the fourth broad objective. 
The Mareva injunction, unaided by other ancillary or connected orders of the court 
can be an extremely effective device where the claimant seeks to freeze a readily 
identifiable asset of sufficient value to discharge the debt owing to them. However in 
evaluating the third broad objective what became apparent is that in order to render 
the Mareva jurisdiction effective in each case, the courts may have to order 
supplementary assistance. That supplementary assistance comes in the form of 
innovative and creative judicial responses or solutions to combat the diverse array of 
techniques employed by deceptive debtors intended to obstruct the creditor’s route 
to recompense. It was noted earlier that the Mareva injunction has been likened to a 
nuclear weapon; however that statement was accurately made in reference to the 
combined effect of the Anton Piller order and the Mareva Injunction.13 In a modern 
context the Mareva injunction cannot be viewed accurately in isolation.  Thus the 
term ‘Mareva jurisdiction’ notionally comes to encompass a matrix of remedies; the 
Mareva injunction and the array of ancillary and connected orders of the court. The 
arsenal of judicial remedies may be required and employed to safeguard the 
administration of justice. However the courts are frequently faced with new issues 
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 Bank Mellat v Nikpour [1985] FSR 87 [92] (Donaldson J). 
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and as a result their acumen alters too. In that respect the Mareva jurisdiction is 
always changing; it is only ever the sum of the judiciaries’ combined experience to 
date. As noted the matrix of ancillary and connected orders of the court is frequently 
growing and evolving and while that reality is indicative of the court’s willingness to 
respond to new problems it also means that the practitioner’s task becomes more 
complex as they consider the best way forwards in each case in reference to the 
gradually changing legal landscape.14 In time it will almost certainly be necessary for 
the Civil Procedure Rules to be fully revised and redrafted to properly represent the 
current legal landscape.         
 
5.16. Chapter Four sought to critically appraise a specific instance where the 
judicial system has worked to solve a complicated and unclear scenario through the 
lens of the Group Seven15 and Lakatamia16 sagas. The distinct problems created by 
separate corporate personality were discussed in relation to the Mareva jurisdiction. 
The concept of corporate personality was found to create an issue where the 
proprietary status of non-defendant company assets are concerned in the case of a 
respondent to a standard form freezing order who also owns and controls that 
company. That difficulty pivoted upon whether or not a standard form order could 
legitimately touch those assets. It was seen that the ambiguity was exacerbated 
when two irreconcilable judgments were coincidentally delivered on the same day by 
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 Note e.g. Hodge J’s recent decision to effectively pierce the corporate veil of entities owned by 
bankrupt respondents. The court allowed what are essentially Mareva injunctions in favour of joint 
trustees in bankruptcy to operate over the assets and businesses of a number of corporate 
respondents. Injunctions were also granted which restrained specific respondents from dealing with 
shares in any of the corporate respondents see, Paul David Wood (n 4).     
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the High Court. On the one hand In Group Seven Hildyard J assumed a conservative 
stance and held that a respondent who arranges for the disposal of company assets 
held by a company that he owns and controls could not be caught by a standard 
form freezing order. On the other hand in Lakatamia Burton J delivered a contrary 
judgment which directed that in such a scenario, the company assets would be 
captured by a standard form order. The disparity presented by the two incompatible 
judgments created an untenable ambiguity for third party banks. A bank must act 
swiftly once placed on notice of the terms of a freezing order and the two conflicting 
decisions signposted very different approaches; Burton J’s decision indicted that a 
bank should freeze the company assets and Hildyard J’s decision directed that to do 
so would be contrary to the well-established principle of separate corporate 
personality.  
 
5.17. On appeal Burton J’s decision was upheld. Although their Lord Justices were 
careful not to impinge upon the sacred Salomon principle by way of an acceptance of 
the first limb of Burton J’s decision. The Court of Appeal found Burton J’s second limb 
to be agreeable, according to which the company assets were caught by the 
injunction by virtue of the fact that the assets could be diminished by the defendants 
dealing with them and that truth prospered the genuine prospect of a diminution in 
the value of his shareholdings in the non-defendant companies. In the Lakatamia Sir 
Bernard Rix also venerated an aspect of Hildyard J’s judgment namely the suggestion 
of the invocation of the Chabra jurisdiction. The Chabra jurisdiction enables a 
claimant to join a third party as a non-cause of action defendant (NCAD) party to 
proceedings. The invocation of the Chabra jurisdiction would thus remove the need 
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to go down the Lakatamia route and allow a claimant to target a third party who 
holds amenable assets during enforcement. 
 
5.18. Throughout Chapters Two and Three the manner in which the courts in 
England interpret the law in relation to equitable principles was discussed. It was also 
noted that the court’s interpretation is invariably the subject of scrutiny in a court of 
higher appellate jurisdiction. That judicial process of interpretation and scrutiny 
propagated the Mareva jurisdiction in England. When joined with the range of 
ancillary and connected orders discussed throughout Chapter Three and Four it was 
demonstrated that the English legal system has proven its ability to evolve in order to 
accommodate contemporary scenarios such as those created by improving 
technologies and globalisation. What has been established is that the courts are both 
able and willing to fashion creative judicial remedies which allow a creditor to act 
with haste to protect their interests in assets which may otherwise be spirited away, 
thus overcoming attempts by debtors to evade their obligations by one means or 
another. That process is symbolic of two things firstly, the idea that equitable 
remedies can evolve in order to fortify the integrity of the court’s processes and 
secondly, the response to the fourth broad objective namely, how the courts ensure 
that the Mareva jurisdiction remains an effective one.  
 
5.19. Looking again at the procedural nature of the Mareva jurisdiction in isolation 
through the lens of the Group Seven and Lakatamia sagas allows the fourth broad 
objective to be explained in the context of a real-world example. At the close of 
Chapter Four it was noted that the mere fact that two apparently incompatible 
judgments were ever given could be regarded as a sign that the English legal system 
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is defective. It could be suggested that the two irreconcilable judgments where 
indicative of judicial vacillation. On the contrary, it is submitted that the two 
judgments were indicative of a system which functions dynamically to respond 
pragmatically to the wide array of scenarios which fall before it as time progresses. A 
sentiment formulated at the close of Chapter Four is repeated; if the legal system 
were an impeccable machinery then there would be no need for the various 
appellate levels of jurisdiction to exist at all. All matters would be resolved perfectly 
at the trial of the first instance. However the English legal system has prospered and 
the doctrines and remedies it has produced persist in jurisdictions across the globe, 
the discourse herein demonstrates and legitimises the English commercial legal 
system which progressively seeks to interpret the law and scrutinise its own 
decisions in order to evolve and realise a more complete form of justice.      
 
5.20. The Mareva jurisdiction remains an exceptional example of the best 
traditions of the English legal system.17 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International 
Bulkcarries SA18 is a recognised precedent in several common law jurisdictions; a fact 
that reveals both its integrity and standing.19  As stated the Mareva jurisdiction is 
progressive and ever since its initiation it has been growing and developing in order 
to meet the demands of modern fraud and the modern creditor/ debtor relationship; 
repeatedly reassessing how best to protect the interests of both parties. The result is 
an order where the interests of each party are skilfully balanced and protected by 
way of specific provisions which are constantly reviewed and (re)assessed by the 
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 Paul McGrath, ‘The Freezing Order: A Constantly Evolving Jurisdiction’ (2012) 31 (1) CJQ 12. 
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rd
 June 1975 in the Court of Appeal, Reported [1980] 1 All ER 213. 
19
 Ronan Keane SC’s Forward to, Thomas B Courtney, Mareva Injunctions and Related Interlocutory 
Orders (Butterworths 1998). 
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judiciary, practitioners and academic lawyers. Recent case law demonstrates that the 
jurisdiction is still swiftly evolving; a prolific body of jurisdictional developments have 
resulted from the JSC sagas.20 A few brief examples are provided: in one JSC BTA Bank 
case21 the Court of Appeal declared that the risk of self-incrimination does not negate 
the disclosure requirement of a Mareva order; in another JSC BTA Bank case22 the 
applicant Bank successfully obtained a receivership order under s. 37 of the Senior 
Courts Act, a decision which was subsequently up-help on appeal23 and in another 
JSC BTA Bank case24 the bank successfully applied for a variation of the receivership 
order which provided the receivers with greater control over the impugned assets. 
The three cases constitute just a handful of actions in the JSC saga which now 
numbers in the region of 50 interim applications and the creation of a considerable 
volume of case law. The JSC sagas demonstrate how dynamic this area of law can be. 
As a result practitioners must be constantly vigilant; todays Mareva jurisdiction is 
markedly different than it was a decade ago, let alone 40 years ago when it was 
founded.    
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 Ablyazov & ors v JSC BTA Bank [2011] EWCA Civ 1588; JSC BTA Bank v A & ors [2009] EWCA 
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22
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5.21. A number of difficulties raised by way of the JSC sagas are yet to be resolved. 
One such issue was entertained by the Supreme Court on 28th July 2015,25 namely 
whether or not a right to draw down pursuant to a facility agreement constitutes an 
‘asset’ within the meaning of the standard form freezing order. If the Supreme Court 
rules that it does, then loan facilities may become subject to restraint on dealing or 
exercise prior to trial. The Supreme Court is currently in recess but when the 
judgment is delivered it could alter the current position vis-à-vis the Mareva 
jurisdiction and choses in action. The issue is problematical not least because of the 
proprietary issues involved in facility agreements. The case raises a number of 
interesting questions which centre on who is regarded as the beneficial owner of 
monies loaned, until such time as a loan agreement is discharged; the creditor or the 
party loaning the monies. That point is significant because the standard form freezing 
order is designed to capture the respondent’s assets or those assets that the 
respondent can deal with ‘as if’ they were their own. Furthermore, if the court 
decides that it can freeze funds loaned by a bank, can those funds legitimately form 
the subject matter of a judgement award before the facility agreement has been fully 
discharged? If the court decides that they can, then would the situation alter if the 
funds had been extended under a Quistclose trust?26 It is recommended that further 
research in this area would certainly be valuable. The ambiguity in relation to choses 
in action and the Mareva jurisdiction may be clarified when the judgment is 
eventually handed down; until then the contention will undoubtedly persist.  
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 JSC BTA Bank (Appellant) v Ablyazov (Respondent) UKSC 2013/0203, on appeal from [2013] 
EWCA Civ 928. 
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 See, Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1968] UKHL 4.  
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5.22. In the process responding to this thesis’ four broad objectives a critique 
crystallised. In the introduction Goode’s suggestion that the Mareva injunction is a 
striking example of the effectiveness of procedural law and the creativity of the 
judiciary was noted. That submission is not disputed per se, in fact this body of work 
has largely substantiated it. Alternatively, a nuance is advanced. Critically appraising 
the statement’s legitimacy highlights an apparent issue with reliance upon 
procedural law and judicial creativity; it can be a long time in the making. The 
Mareva jurisdiction was originally opposed above all else because it appeared to be 
contrary to a well-established restrictive rubric. This body of work demonstrated that 
the Mareva injunction derives its heritage from the equitable jurisdiction. It is 
tempting to raise the equitable jurisdiction to lofty heights; to claim that it 
transcends the inelastic realms of the positive law. Equity is often heralded as the 
law’s conscience, about the business of upholding the spirit of justice and to some 
extent this body of work has corroborated that concept. However the fact remains 
that it took the tenacity and pragmatism Lord Denning MR to innovate, to turn the 
tables in favour of the injured creditor. Had it not been for the tenacity and juridical 
pragmatism of Lord Denning MR and his Court of Appeal then it is likely that the 
restrictive status quo would have persisted for some time more. 
 
5.23. Case law is littered with comments amounting to an unwillingness amongst the 
judiciary to create strong precedent without the guidance, approval or intervention 
of the legislature. Lindley LJ demonstrated that predilection in Lister27 in reference to 
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the restrictive rubric which was restated by Cotton LJ.28 Those limiting and restrictive 
statements persuaded Donaldson J that the very initiation of the Mareva jurisdiction 
was contrary to a well-established precedent; a precedent which is now beyond 
doubt defunct.29 Today, with the power of hindsight it appears obvious that the 
restrictive status quo was misinterpreted, misapplied or given too much credence by 
cautious members of the judiciary. Lord Devlin once commented that members of 
the judiciary ‘tend to be old-fashioned in their ideas’.30 It is argued that members of 
the judiciary should be willing to challenge precedent which obstructs their 
pragmatic judgement. Judges of higher jurisdiction should be willing to innovate, to 
test the judicial waters in order to foster a truly forward thinking and pragmatic legal 
system.31 If their decisions are mistaken then as it has been seen throughout this 
discourse the appellate system will rectify their judgment; but if they work with the 
conceptual elasticity which equity can enable then as has been witnessed herein, 
uniquely effective remedies can be created which can render the processes of the 
court more effective.32  
 
5.24. The modern Mareva case is typically sophisticated but may also be complicated 
by jurisdictional issues; amenable assets are often located in one or more 
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jurisdictions and the primary defendant may not be domiciled in anyone of them. 
The Mareva injunction is part of the practically effective matrix of remedies which 
has been developed to combat and manage aspects of fraud, matrimonial disputes, 
creditor and debtor relationships and cases of insolvency. It has been argued that in 
the corporate context the modern Mareva jurisdiction has contributed significantly 
towards the appeal of England as the preferred jurisdiction.33 Part of the allure of 
English company law is that it entertains concepts such as universality which direct 
that an insolvent company’s assets and liabilities are to be regarded as one 
irrespective of location.34 Furthermore, English company law embraces the notion 
that all creditors, regardless of location ought to be treated equally in line with the 
common priorities determined by the law of companies in England.35  
 
5.25. In order for the courts to be able to judiciously and consistently dispense justice 
which touches assets placed beyond domestic borders the courts continue to be 
careful not to offend the judicial sovereignty of another jurisdiction and they remain 
willing to assist another jurisdiction in order to propagate the transnational cultures 
of inter-jurisdictional cooperation and collaboration necessary to combat the 
modern elusive debtor.36  The Worldwide Mareva jurisdiction was discussed and it 
was seen that much of the rationale which drives the court’s willingness to allow an 
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order which touches a foreign asset or an order which assists foreign proceedings are 
influenced by notions of comity, jurisdictional cooperation and mutuality. It was 
found that jurisdictional cooperation and mutuality is increasingly important in the 
Mareva context because of the abovementioned transnational aspects. Since 1972 
English company law has been influenced heavily by EC Company Law harmonisation 
objectives;37 it was also seen that the Union generally seeks to develop a spirit of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters with a cross border element.38 The arrival of the 
European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) which can be considered to be a 
product of the emergent European spirit of cooperation is a sign that trends are 
generally moving towards a unified Mareva style approach.39  The growth of 
harmonised Pan-European responses to Mareva scenarios is undoubtedly 
progressive. However it is noted that modern corporations and conglomerates are 
increasingly transnationally diverse entities; in order to manage the Mareva 
scenarios of the future effectively and efficiently the growth of a Universalist or 
harmonised pan-global Mareva style approach, codified in international law may 





                                                     
37
 A goal facilitated largely by directives pursuant to Art 44(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty. 
38
 Article 81(1) on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
39
 It is restated that although England has chosen to opt out of the EAPO, England already has a policy 
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